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In the first chapter, we use patent and financial data from the pharmaceutical 
industry to examine the effects of international innovation on profitability and the channels 
through which the effects take place. Positive impacts of internationalization are found for 
both innovation performance and financial performance. In the second chapter, we examine 
the impact of uncertainty on firms’ decisions related to R&D expenditures, patenting, and 
physical capital investments using a sample of firms in the global pharmaceuticals industry. 
Our results indicate that uncertainty has mixed effect on the innovation variables: it affects 
R&D negatively, but has a weak and ambiguous effect on patents. The estimated impact 
on capital investment is negative. In the third chapter, using U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) recall data from 2001-2013, we examine various factors that may 
determine recalls. We consider a wide range of firm-specific and device-specific measures 
such as their R&D expenditures, foreign versus domestic ownership, size of firms, degree 
of vertical integration, device complexity, profitability, among several other variables. In 
our empirical analysis, we examine whether there are systematic longer-run differences in 
recalled devices across the firms in our sample, and whether firm-specific and device-
specific attributes can explain why some firms systematically have a higher or lower 
number of recalls.  
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CHAPTER 1. INTERNATIONALIZATION OF INNOVATION, 
PATENTS, AND FIRM PERFORMANCE IN THE 
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 
1.1 Introduction 
With the advance of globalization, the number of research and development (R&D) 
facilities established by firms in foreign locations has been increasing. This has drawn 
increasing academic and policy attention to examine the determinants and the effects of the 
internationalization of innovation. Early work of the internationalization of innovation 
focused on the determinants of international innovation (e.g., Cheng and Bolon, 1993; 
Granstrand et al. 1993), and the organizational management of international innovation 
(e.g., Gassmann and von Zedtwitz, 1998; Nobel and Birkinshaw, 1998). In a 
comprehensive survey of early studies on this topic, Granstrand et al. (1993) summarized 
forces stimulating internationalization of innovation at company, national, and 
international levels. Some of the important forces at the firm level include: subsidiaries 
previously depending on technology transfer from parents might establish their own units 
to save cost; multinational enterprises might conduct R&D targeted on local needs to better 
serve local markets; and friendly government policies of developing countries might 
provide low-cost local R&D personnel. Subsequent studies continued the investigation on 
the determinants and focused more on the effects of the internationalization of R&D and 
innovation more generally.  
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From this literature, it appears that internationalization of innovation could be driven 
by either the advantages of its home country, or the advantages of the host country. In the 
first case, a firm can extend its existing innovation competencies to a foreign country and 
to earn extra overseas profits; in this case it is likely that knowledge flows from the firm’s 
host country to the foreign country. In the second case, a firm can augment its existing 
knowledge base by tapping into foreign knowledge; in this case, knowledge is likely to 
flow from the foreign country to the firm. These two channels are often called “exploiting” 
and “exploring” (He and Wong, 2004).  
The benefits from “exploitation” include refining existing knowledge, reducing 
transaction costs, and expediting decision-making (Özsomer and Gençtürk, 2003). Benefits 
from “exploration” include tapping into leading knowledge in the host country for new 
technology, and communicating with local suppliers and customers for new ideas (e.g., 
Penner-Hahn and Shaver, 2005). Besides these benefits, firms also have to deal with costs 
associated with internationalization of innovation. These include increase in coordination 
cost (Singh, 2008), communication cost (Fisch, 2003), possible rent-seeking behavior of 
subsidiaries (Mudambi and Navarra, 2004), and risk from the uncertainty of the host 
economic environment and information leakage (Granstrand et al., 1993).  
Besides the discussion on the possible benefits and costs of internationalization of 
innovation, the limited number of studies on the impacts have mixed findings. This paper 
will add to the literature of the impacts of international innovation on both innovation 
performance and financial performance. To fully investigate the impacts, we compiled a 
dataset on top pharmaceutical firms in U.S. and Europe including both financial and 
innovation data. A comprehensive set of indicators were built to measure different aspects 
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of the international innovation. Based on the estimation results of the indicators, we can 
easily find the aspects of the internal innovation contribute most to firms’ innovation or 
financial performance. Therefore, this paper can provide suggestions for firms’ strategies 
in the international innovation. 
In next section, we summarize several empirical studies on the effects of 
internationalization of innovation. In Section 3 we discuss the industry context for our 
study. In section 4, we discuss the research question and note our hypotheses. Section 5 
provides details of our data, and in Section 6 we note our variable definitions, conduct a 
preliminary data analysis, and specify the estimation strategies. In Section 7 we discuss the 
estimation results. Section 8 presents our concluding remarks. 
1.2 Studies on the Effects of Internationalization of Innovation 
Although several studies have suggested that internationalization of innovation can 
affect firm performance, a somewhat limited number of studies have rigorously empirically 
explored these effects. The evidence is mixed.  
For financial performance, Fors (1997) found that affiliate R&D had no significant 
influence on parent firm growth, while Todo and Shimizutani (2008) only found weakly 
positive effects on parent firm productivity. For innovation performance, Penner-Hahn and 
Shaver (2005) found that international R&D could increase the patents outputs for Japanese 
pharmaceutical firms with existing research capabilities in the underlying technologies; 
Furman et al. (2005) found that the number of R&D locations in a specific therapeutic class 
for U.S. pharmaceutical firms is negatively related to patent counts; Leiponen and Helfat 
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(2006) found that dispersed R&D in Finnish firms only benefits firms’ imitative 
innovation, and not novel innovation. 
Based on the benefits and costs of the internationalization of innovation, we examine 
its effects on firms’ financial performance. Since the effects of internationalization 
innovation on innovation would finally influence firm’s financial performance through its 
effects on innovation, we also examine the effects of international innovation on innovation 
outcomes. In this study, we will not treat the two types of performances separately, but 
analyze them together to better understand the effects of internationalization on firms’ 
innovation and performance. 
1.3 Research Question 
1.3.1 Industry Context 
The main participants of international innovation are firms operating in R&D-
intensive industries. Gassmann and von Zedtwitz (1999) studied globally dispersed R&D 
and relationships between individual R&D sites. They divided firms into five categories in 
terms of international R&D organization: (1) ethnocentric centralized R&D, (2) geocentric 
centralized R&D, (3) polycentric decentralized R&D, (4) R&D hub model, and (5) 
integrated R&D network. Since the pharmaceutical industry has developed systematically 
towards competence-based organization, they assigned it to the last category, which is 
characterized by an organizational structure with highly dispersed R&D and several 
competence R&D centers. 
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A survey by Dunning and Wymbs (1999) on the world largest multinationals shows 
an important reason for this categorization – pharmaceutical firms obtain more of their 
competitive advantage from foreign sources than firms in other sectors. A report by the 
National Science Board (2012) compared the internationalization of innovation among 
industries in United States. This study revealed that by 2012, the pharmaceutical industry 
was the industry that performed the most R&D outside of the United States ($10.9 billion), 
based on Business R&D and Innovation Survey. Given these facts, the pharmaceutical 
industry is a good subject for studying international innovation. 
As one of the few studies on the effect of internationalization of innovation, the study 
by Penner-Hahn and Shaver (2005) examined the effect of international R&D on patent 
output of Japanese pharmaceutical firms. They found that firms benefit from international 
R&D only when they possess existing research capabilities in the underlying technologies.  
Using patent data from three (you say three, but only TWO are mentioned) major 
patent authorities, EPO (European Patent Office) and USPTO (United States Patent and 
Trademark Office), this paper examines the dynamics of patenting under the influence of 
the international innovation and investigates the relationship between international 
innovation and firm performance of large U.S. and European pharmaceutical firms.  
1.3.2 Hypothesis for Testing 
According to previous studies (Archibugi and Michie, 1995; Archibugi and 
Lammarino, 1999), globalization of innovation falls into three categories: (1) the 
international exploitation of technology produced on a national basis; (2) the technological 
collaborations of firms across national borders, i.e. agreements between firms for joint 
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development; (3) the global generation of innovation by MNCs. Since the first category 
concerns exports of goods, licensing, and production rather that R&D activities, while the 
second is about two different firms located in two or more countries, we focus on the third 
category in this study, which refers to innovation generated by single proprietors on the 
global scale.  
As mentioned previously, firms have many motivations to be involved in 
international innovation. Whether the motivation is more of home country advantage or 
host country advantage, the expecting results for all these strategies and actions is to apply 
or improve firms’ research capability. For the international innovation driven by home 
country the firms would extend its existing knowledge to the host country through adapting 
its existing technology to local market, which would lead to patents of the technology in 
the host country. The adaptation and feedbacks from the new market would also be 
beneficial for firms’ future innovation, which would reveal as more patents in the future. 
For the international innovation driven by host country advantage, the results are clearer. 
The firm would acquire new technologies by accessing the knowledge that is 
geographically bound in the host country, improve its research capability by learning after 
local companies and research institutes, and gaining new ideas by communicating with 
customers form more advanced markets. Therefore, we will first test the following 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: International innovation is expected to increase the number of patents 
granted to a firm. 
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Economists have long explored the impacts fo R&D activities. R&D has been found 
to beneficial for improvements on productivity (Mansfield, 1980; Griliches, 1986; etc.), 
which will eventually show in the profit. For the pharmaceutical industry the link between 
R&D and profit is even clearer. The patents for a new drug would secure the exclusive 
selling rights for the firm, then leads to extra profit for the firm. Therefore, following the 
channel of Hypothesis 1, the positive effects of international innovation on innovation 
output, or patent output, would eventually lead to its positive effects on profit. In addition, 
there are also other channels through which the international innovation would have 
impacts on firms’ profits. As mentioned above, the other benefits of international 
innovation, including reducing transaction costs, higher reputation in local market, and 
better communication with local markets, would also have positive impacts on profits. 
However, the costs of international innovation, including increase in coordination costs, 
possible rent-seeking behavior of subsidiaries, risk from uncertainty of the host country 
economy, and information leakage, would lead to negative impacts on profits. 
Summarizing the impacts and empirical studies on this topic, since it is hard to predict the 
effect of internationalization of innovation on profit through other channels, the final 
impacts of international innovation on profits is hard to predict. Due to the scope of this 
paper, we will only focus on the effect through the innovation channel (Hypothesis 1), and 
the final effect through all channels (Hypothesis 2), leaving the effects through other 
channels to further studies. Based on the observation of the popularity of international 
innovation and the close link of patents and profits in the pharmaceutical industry, we 
expect the positive impacts would overweight the negative impacts, therefore the final 
impacts of international innovation on profits would be positive. 
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Hypothesis 2: International innovation is expected to improve a firm’s profitability. 
Overall, the two hypotheses together test the effects of international innovation on 
firm performances, including both financial performance (Hypothesis 1), and innovation 
performance (Hypothesis 2). In other words, we examine the effects of international 
innovation on two aspects: profitability and innovation outputs.  
1.4 Data 
Our study is for the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries, defined by North 
American Industry Classification System (NAICS): 325411 – Medicinal and Botanical 
Manufacturing; 325412 – Pharmaceutical Preparation Manufacturing; and 541711 – 
Research and Development in Biotechnology. For convenience, in this paper, we refer to 
firms in both industries as “pharmaceutical firms.” 
1.4.1 Sample 
We include all top pharmaceutical firms in recent years. To get a listing of these 
firms, we referred to several online sources, including Current Partnering, PMLiVE, 
Contract Pharma and Wikipedia. Lists from these sources are all based on financial data 
after 2007 and include no more than 50 firms. We then combined them into a final list of 
big pharmaceutical firms in the U.S. and Europe. The top firms listed and used in this study 
include 172 firms worldwide. Since the study focuses on U.S and European firms and there 
are firms that we cannot find financial information, our final sample drops to 63 firms. The 
list can be found in Table A1 in the Appendix. 
1.4.1.1 Patent data 
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Our patent data are from PubWEST, which includes patents from United State Patent 
and Trademark Office (USPTO), European Patent Office (EPO), and Japan Patent Office 
(JPO)1. We include only USPTO and EPO patents under corresponding pharmaceutical 
categories defined by IPC (International Patent Classification), which are A61K 
(Preparations for medical, dental, or toilet purposes) and C12N (Micro-organisms or 
enzymes; Compositions thereof; Propagating, preserving, or maintaining micro-organisms; 
Mutation or genetic engineering; Culture media).  
To include all the patents for each firm, we made queries using both the names of the 
parent company and its subsidiaries. Public listed firms in U.S. are required to submit 
filings every year about their finance and operation. Therefore, 10-K is the most updated 
source for firm’s subsidiaries. To simplify the procedure, we only use the most recent one, 
the 2012 10-K for U.S. firms.2 We referred to the 2012 10-K of most firms publicly traded 
in US for their subsidiaries information.  Subsidiaries information for other firms is from 
Mergent Online. We also manually update the ownership of the patents for some firms for 
years after mergers and acquisitions.  
1.4.1.2 Economic and Financial Data 
                                                 
1 The JPO data provided by the PubWEST has only basic information with missing values for important 
fields, such as patent class, inventors, and the address of the inventors, so the JPO data is excluded from the 
sample. The other reason for the exclusion is that patent laws in U.S. and Europe are similar, while patent 
laws in Japan is much different. Therefore, every firm in our sample has patents from its home patent 
authority, and the patents are regulated by similar patent laws. These factors are very important for 
international patenting and international innovation. 
2 Due to the simplification, we are not able to have highly-accurate subsidiary information for each firm in 
each year. We assume that the change in subsidiaries are very small from year to year and firms will always 
keep patents under the name of the parent firm or existing subsidiaries unless they would like to sell their 
patents together with a subsidiary, which we do not capture in our data. 
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We collected the annual accounting data of publicly-traded pharmaceutical firms 
from the Compustat database3 . Data on firms traded in USA and Canada are from 
Compustat North America, while data on other publicly traded firms are from Compustat 
Global. After matching firms on our list with those in the Compustat in the period from 
1990 to 2010, we have a final sample of 63 firms.  
1.4.1.3 Other Data Issues 
Since our dataset comes from different data sources, we did more work to 
consistently combining data from different data sources together. Even though the two 
datasets from Compustat and PubWEST can be combined using corporate registration and 
identification information, inconsistences in year coverage exist between the two datasets. 
In other words, the starting year for a firm’s patent data, the starting year for a firm’s 
financial data, and the official or legal starting year for a firm might be different. After our 
manual treatment based on information from Bloomberg, Mergent Online, firm’s own 
websites, and Compustat, a firm might have a different starting year from the starting year 
of the study period for one of the following two reasons: (1) the firm was formed by 
merging with another firm; (2) the firm was separated from another firm (spin-off). 
Likewise, a firm’s ending year might be different from the ending year of the study period 
because it was later acquired by another firm.  
                                                 
3 R&D data from Compustat include a lot missing and abnormal values, therefore, we instead collected 
R&D expenditure data from the annual financial reports provided by MergentOnline. 
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For patent data from PubWEST, some patents with US inventors have missing values 
in the inventor country field, but have values in the inventor state field. Therefore, the 
country information used in this study was in fact a combination of these two fields. 
1.4.2 Variable definitions  
1.4.2.1 Measures of firm performance 
The previous literature uses different measures of financial performance. For 
example, Fors (1997) used parent firm growth, while Todo and Shimizutani (2008) used 
parent firm productivity. In this paper, we regard the financial performance measure as a 
final measure of the effect of international innovation. Therefore, we use the profitability 
of the whole company. Three measures of profitability are commonly used in the literature: 
(1) Return on Assets (ROA), which is net income divided by total assets; (2) EBIT 
(Earnings before Interests and Taxes) divided by total assets to measure firms’ profitability. 
This is a commonly used measure of profitability (e.g. Dewenter and Malatesta, 2001). 
Unlike net profit, EBIT exclude all possible biases caused by firms’ financial strategies; 
(3) net profit rate, which is net income divided by total sales. The first two measures 
measure how much profit a firm can generate from its current assets. The last measure 
measures how much affirm can keep as profit from its sales income. In this paper, we 
investigate the impacts of the international innovation on firms’ profits. We expect firms 
would have improvements on its research capability or R&D productivity through 
internationalization of innovation, therefore, the number of inventions should also increase. 
Inventions and other knowledge on production are important components of a firm’s 
intangible assets, therefore, important components of the total assets. In addition, the 
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correlation of the first two measures and the indicators of internationalization of innovation 
are higher than the correlation between the last measure and the indicators. Hence, the 
profitability measures based on total assets (first two measures) are more appropriate to 
use in the study. Since the estimation results of the first two measures are very close to 
each other, we only show the estimation results using the first measure. The summary 
statistics and estimation results of the other two measure can be found in the Appendix. 
Patents are awards to firms’ research activities and are often linked to new 
technologies introduced the market. Patents are considered as the outputs of a firm’s 
innovation efforts (Pakes, 1985, Griliches, 1980) in this paper. Pharmaceutical industry, 
overall, has a very high patenting rate and patents are critical to a firm’s success (Scherer 
at al., 1959; Mansfield, 1986; Levin et al., 1987; Coad and Rao, 2008; Helmers and Roger, 
2011; etc.). According to a survey by researchers at Carnegie-Mellon University in 1994 
(Cohen et al., 2000), pharmaceutical firms reported that 78% of their business units filed 
for patents. In the literature, both patent applications and patent grants are used to count 
patent numbers. Due to the patenting process, there is a considerable time lag from filing 
to granting. Therefore, the patent application4 is a better measure of a firm’s innovation 
outcome. 
1.4.2.2 Measures of internationalization of innovation 
Researchers have used different methods to measure the internationalization of 
innovation. These include survey-based measures (Panner-Hahn and Shaver, 2005), R&D 
                                                 
4 Generally, not all patent applications will be granted. One of the common reasons for the failure is that the 
patent authority does not think the invention is not innovative enough, so the patents grant is believed to be 
a better measure of innovation. To accommodate both the quality of the invention and the timing of the 
process, we use successful patent applications in our dataset.  
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expenditure-based measures (Belderbos et al., 2007), and patent-based measures (Quintás 
et al., 2008). In this paper, we use patent-based measures. 
We use patent inventor address information to find evidence of international 
innovation. The output of international innovation would naturally be patents with 
inventors from foreign countries. Based on different hypotheses, researchers proposed 
different approaches to use the address of inventors to decide whether a patent is the output 
of international innovation, including first-inventor counting (i.e. assign a patent to the 
country where the first inventor comes from), multiple-counting (i.e. every country where 
the inventors come from gets one patent count), fractional-counting (i.e. every country 
where the inventors come from gets a fraction of one patent count), majority-counting (i.e. 
assigning a patent to the country where most of its inventors come). Therefore, the first and 
last approach would cause a patent to be assigned only to one country, while the second 
and third approach might cause a patent to be assigned to more than one country. According 
to OECD (2004), the first-inventor counting is the most commonly used approach, which 
is supported by two hypotheses: first, the first inventor is generally considered as the most 
important contributor to a patent; second, the country from which the first inventor of a 
patent comes generally reveals the origins of the invention (Cantwell and Kosmopoulou, 
2001; Trajtenberg, 2001). Bergek and Bruzelius (2010) compared different approaches 
mentioned above in a case study of a Sweden pharmaceutical company, ABB. They found 
that, using information from interviews with patent inventors as the base line, none of the 
approaches generated substantially differences in results, although general differences did 
exist among different approaches. Combining these reasons, our use of address of the first 
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inventor seems well-grounded in the literature. Below we describe the alternative 
measures. 
Internationalization Indicator 1 
Indicator 1 equals the percentage of patents granted by foreign patent authorities out 
of the total number of patents of the firm from both EPO and USPTO. For example, if a 
firm in U.S. have 100 successful applications from EPO, and 200 from USPTO, then 
Indicator 1 = 100/ (100+200) =33%.  
International patenting is a common practice that a firm have the same invention 
pated in both home and foreign country (countries). Motivations for international patenting 
mainly include: more protection of important technology, or exclusive selling right in 
foreign market. Since the invention protected by international patenting can be produced 
at either home country or foreign country, firms involve in international patenting might 
not necessarily involves in international innovation. However, these firms at least have 
more consideration on international production, operation, or marketing, therefore, they 
are more likely to involve in international innovation now and in the future. However, since 
Indicator 1 use the total number of patents granted by both home and foreign patent 
authority, it is likely to include double-counting of the same invention. Therefore, Indicator 
1 is just a gross indicator of international innovation, which serves as the beginning point 
of our measurement of international innovation.  
Internationalization Indicator 2 
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Indicator 2 equals the percentage of patents with foreign inventors out of all the 
patents granted by home patent authorities. That is, for a firm from Country i, if m is the 




In most cases, international innovation is conducted by scientists in foreign countries 
who later became the inventors of patents. In other words, innovational innovation often 
results in patents with foreign inventors. Due to the importance of home country market 
and safety of technology, firms would have all their inventions patented in their home 
countries in most cases. Therefore, Indicator 2 should represent the percentage of 
international innovation out of a firm’s total innovation.  
In addition, since the total used in this measurement is the patents granted by only 
home patent authority there is no double-counting issue here. However, in some cases, 
firms might consider an invention in the foreign county is not important for the home 
market and have no safety issue for the invention to be only protected in the foreign 
country. Then they would not patent the invention created in a foreign country through the 
home patent authority., For this case, Indicator 2 would miss the international innovation 
for the firm and has a value less than the true percentage of the firm’s international 
innovation. We expect this doesn’t apply to many firms in most case, so although Indicator 
2 might not be an accurate measure, it is at least lower-bound of the true international 
innovation. 
Internationalization Indicator 3 
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Indicator 3 counts the number of years since a firm’s first patent with first inventor 
with addresses outside of the home country. This measure is built according to Quintás et 
al. (2008), in which the measure is named “international technological experience”.  
As mentioned earlier, international innovation is associated with many different 
types of benefits and costs. Therefore, firms need to develop their own strategy to 
maximize the benefits and to minimize costs. Firms, which start international innovation 
early, should have more experiences to develop and employ their strategies. If we use 
patents with the first inventor with addresses out of the firm’s home country as the evidence 
of international innovation, the first patent of that kind should mark the beginning of the 
firm’s international innovation. 5 
It is possible for a firm to have a patent with a foreign inventor 10 years ago, but still 
involved little international innovation now. We argue that this type of firms should still 
have more knowledge on internationalization of innovation than firms without any patents 
with foreign inventors yet. What’s more, we leave the measure of the volume as the focus 
of the first two indicators.  
Internationalization Indicator 4 
                                                 
5 Since our data are collected for patents applied from 1990 to 2010, the maximum for this indicator would 
be 21 for all firms in all years. However, if a firm participated in international innovation earlier than 1990, 
this indicator will still give a value of 21. Thus, this indicator has a truncation problem. However, after 
digging into the data, we find this would not cause a lot harm to our analysis, because the maximum for 
Indicator 3 is 19. The mean of Indicator 3 at 2010 is 3.4. This means that the case that a firm involved in 
international innovation earlier than 1990 rarely happens. Therefore, the truncation problem of the data 
would not seriously affect the validity of our analysis. 
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Indicator 4 counts the number of countries the first inventors come from, using all 
the patents applications filed to the home patent authorities in a certain year. This indicator 
is built based on the measure named “geographical amplitude” in Quintás et al. (2008).  
Every inventor with a foreign address brings the firm with new ideas, technologies, 
or market information to the firm’s knowledge pool. More countries the firm taps into, 
more foreign inventors would join the firm to produce knowledge, more foreign knowledge 
the firm could learn, therefore, more patents would be applied by inventors outside of the 
home country.  
It is possible that a firm might have 10 foreign inventors in total, but all of them came 
from the same foreign country, and another firm might also have 10 foreign inventors in 
total, but each of them comes from a different country. It is hard to say which of the two is 
more involved in the internationalization of innovation. But Indicator 4 shows us the 
Second firm has a broader view in the international innovation. However, same as Indicator 
3, Indicator 4 only measures the width of the knowledge pool, or the geographical 
amplitude, and leaves the volume of the international innovation to be measure by the first 
two indicators.  
1.4.2.3 More Discussion on the Internationalization Indicators 
To summarize, Indicator 1 measures international patenting; Indicator 2 measure the 
“volume” of the international innovation; Indicator 3 measures the “depth” of a firm’s 
international knowledge pool, or global technological experience; and Indicator 4 measures 
the “width” of the firm’s international knowledge pool. Each indicator measures from 
different perspectives, and has its limitation. Therefore, the four indicators are not 
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replacements for each other, but complements. Using all of them, we can measure different 
dimensions and have a better picture of the international innovation. To make the four 
indicators comparable in magnitude, we standardized the four indicators with zero means 
and unit variance.  
Table 1 - Indicators 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
ind1 1,025 3.43E-09 1 -1.29558 2.263565 
ind2 1,025 7.83E-09 1 -0.66131 2.819209 
ind3 1,025 1.54E-08 1 -2.02748 1.406342 





Figure 1 - Four indicators of internationalization of innovation 
 
The summary statistics is shown in Table 1. The correlation between indicators range 
from 0.1124 to 0.395, Figure 1 shows the trends for the four indicators. All the indicators 
have an increasing trend, although the rate of increase differs, with higher rate of increase 
for IND4 than other three. Combining the indicators together, we can have more 
information of the firms. Indicator 3 can help us find starter and existing firms involved in 
the internationalization of innovation. Indicator 1 or Indicator 3 can give us how much 
international innovation were created by the firm. Therefore, we can have the firms in the 
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Table 2 - Firm Types by Indicators 
Firm type Indicators Percentage 
Slow starter Low Indicator 3, low Indicator 1 and 2 20.8%  
Quick starter Low Indicator 3, high Indicator 1 and 2 31.9%  
Winner High Indicator 3, high Indicator 1 and 2 18.15% 
Loser High Indicator 3, low Indicator 1 and 2 7.32% 
We find that 20.8% of the sample are slow starters, 31.9% of the sample are quick 
starters, and 18.15% are winners. The high percentage of quick starters, and 18.15% are 
winners. The high percentage of quick starters and lower percentage of winners can all be 
partly explained by the property of the sample. The sample is all top pharmaceutical firms. 
They should have better size and research capability to begin international innovation. As 
the time went on, the percentage of international innovation would be driven down by the 
increase in the total innovation output. We use this classification to add dummies of firms 
type into the estimation. The results are discussed in later parts.   
1.4.3 Preliminary Data Analysis 
In this section, we conduct a preliminary analysis of our data to highlight various 
characteristics related to the internationalization of innovation. 
Main variables used in estimation are listed in Table 2 with their labels and brief 
definition. Table 3 reports descriptive statistics for main variables in the study. Our sample 











Counts of patent applications filed by a firm in a 
certain year 
pstock Patent stock The sum of patent application counts in the last three 
years as the measure for research capability 
rd_real R&D in real 
values 
R&D spending adjusted by GDP deflator for OECD 
countries (base year 2010) 
rd_intensity R&D intensity R&D spending divided by sales 
sale_real Sales in real 
values 
Sales adjusted by GDP deflator for OECD countries 
(base year 2010) 
Ind1 Indicator 1 International patenting 
Ind2 Indicator 2 Volume 
Ind3 Indicator 3 Depth of the knowledge pool 
Ind4 Indicator 4 Width of the knowledge pool 
Profit1 Profit measure 1 ROA 
Profit2 Profit measure 2 EBIT/total asset 
Profit3 Profit measure 3 Net income/sales 
EMP Employee 
numbers 
Number of Employees in thousands 
MA M&A dummy MA=1 if the firm has M&A in the year 
Note: Lagged variables are not listed here. Lagged variables are simply the previous values 
of the variables listed here and are named by adding letter “L.” in front of the original 
variables. For example, L.ind1 is the lagged value for ind1, i.e. the previous value of 




Table 4 - Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Std. 
Dev. 
pat 72.07 133.06 
pstock 220.74 394.95 
rd_real 994.79 1,793.01 
rd_intensity 4.58 31.69 
ind1 0.00 1.00 
ind2 0.00 1.00 
ind3 0.00 1.00 
ind4 0.00 1.00 
profit1 -0.11 0.38 
profit2 -0.07 0.38 
profit3 -5.45 41.67 
ebit 1,627.13 3,292.19 
ni 1,058.65 2,407.19 
sale_real 4,291.02 7,442.22 
ma 0.76 2.13 
emp 21.64 34.32 
 
In Figure 2, we compare the trends of patent applications by the firms in our sample 
to EPO and USPTO. Despite the changes in the number of patent applications to EPO in 
recent years, the two patent authorities are generally comparable in terms of patent 
applications volume. Therefore, although we only use U.S. and European patents of U.S. 




Figure 2 - Trend of patent application numbers: by patent authorities 
In this paper, we use the address of the first inventor to provide evidence for the 
internationalization of innovation. If the inventor has a foreign address, it is very likely that 
the inventor lived or worked in the foreign country when the invention was completed, 
therefore the patent is very likely to be the outcome of R&D using foreign resources. 
Although due to the data limitations we only have the address information for the first 
inventor, we discuss in next section that this is a most commonly used measure of 
international innovation. Using this measure, Figures 3 to 5 display the general trends in 
































































































a. Trend of international innovation: total patents 
 
b. Trend of KOF indicator 




























































































































































































































































































































b. Top five host countries, 1990, 2000, 2010 
Figure 4 - Countries involved in internationalization of innovation 
 
Figure 5 - Trend of firms involved in international innovation 
As shown in Figure 3a, from 1990 to 2010, the number of patents of international 
innovation has been increasing with only small drops recently. Since internationalization 














































































































we choose the KOF Indicator of Globalization to find the trend of globalization. Figure 3b 
shows us globalization indeed had a similar path as international innovation, particularly 
for the decrease in recent years. From Figure 4a and Figure 5, we can see that both the 
number of countries and the number of firms involved in international R&D are in general 
increasing during the sample period with fluctuations. Both numbers were nearly steady in 
recent years, which might indicate a slowdown of international innovation. Figure 4b 
shows us the composition of the international innovation. The US, Germany, and Great 
Britain remain in the top three without change in the ranking even. They account for around 
60% of the total international innovation. Even though the total amount the top three 
accounts do not change much, the amount by US has been increasing, from 26% to 36%. 
Belgian always ranks 4th or 5th. Besides the top five countries, the amounts by other 
countries has been increasing slow from 21% to 29%. To summarize, these charts is 
consistent with the previous chars in that more and more countries are involved in the 
internationalization of innovation. However, the center place of US as the country involved 
most has also been enhancing through the sample period.  
Through the trend of patenting of all the firms in the sample, we have a general 
understanding of the international innovation over our sample period. The increasing trend 
of international innovation provide general support for the effects of international 
innovation on firm performance. 
1.5 Estimation Strategies 
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We employ different methods for estimating the effects of uncertainty: (1) negative 
binomial and Poisson estimator for innovation performance, (2) dynamic panel model for 
financial performance. 
The patent production function is widely used in patenting studies (e.g. Hall and 
Ziedonis, 2001; Hu and Jefferson, 2009). We specify our augmented patent production 
function as: 
𝐸(𝑃𝐴𝑇) = exp(𝑽′𝜷𝑽 + 𝑰𝑵𝑫
′𝜷𝑰) (1) 
where PAT is the count of patent applications 6 , the vector V stands for traditional 
explanatory variables in the patent production function, including R&D expenditures, firm 
size, research capability and other variables. IN is the international innovation. 
Taking logarithm for both sides and specifying our estimation function as: 
𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑖,𝑡) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 𝑙𝑛(𝑅𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝛽3 𝑙𝑛(𝑝𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1)
+𝛽4𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑀𝐴𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡 (2)
 
where IND is still the indicator of international innovation, RD is R&D intensity, pstock is 
the patent stock, and u is the error term. 7 
Since the dependent variable is patent counts, we employ Poisson and Negative 
binomial regression models, which are commonly used in studies of patent output (e.g. 
                                                 
6 Since PAT = 0 occurs, we have all the PAT added by 1, so PAT starts from 1, even though the firm did 
not file for a patent in that year. This would not affect the results much, because firms in our sample are all 
big firms in the industry with high volume of patent applications. The mean of PAT in our dataset is about 
70, and it has a variance of 132. 
7 Since zero values were found for some firms at some years, we added 1 to PAT, therefore, the patent 
number start from 1, and are suitable for logarithm. 
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Henderson and Cockburn, 1996; Hall and Ziedonis, 2001; Penner-Hahn and Shaver, 2005; 
Hu and Jefferson, 2009). For the fixed effect Negative Binomial regression models, there 
is a potential “incidental parameters problem”. We have noticed several options to deal 
with this type of problem. We will address this potential bias later on. 
Our interested independent variables are the indicator variable. As mentioned earlier, 
the indicators on the right-hand side is patent-based measures. Except for IND1 in which 
we use PAT as its denominator, other indicators are correlated with PAT, but do not use 
PAT as a component. The correlation between PAT and IND1 to IND3 is not high, ranging 
from 0.06 to 0.16. The correlation with IND4 is exceptionally high, 0.78, but IND4 counts 
the number of countries, which are not linearly correlated with PAT. What’s more, since 
the indicators are included separately into the model, one at a time. Hence, problems with 
any indicator would not affect the results of other indicators. Therefore, including 
indicators as explanatory variables should not create severe problems in our models. We 
include R&D expenditure as the input for innovation. R&D expenditure is a long-term 
investment, which takes time to have impacts (Barker and Mueller, 2002). However, it is 
generally difficult to identify the lag structure of the impacts. Moreover, the lag structure 
is likely to be different among firms and projects. As discussed in Hall and Ziedonis (1995), 
due to “the high within-firm correlation of R&D spending over time”, the estimation results 
among R&D variables with different lag periods are “roughly the same”. So here we use 
one-year lagged R&D to be consist with other variables in the model. We measure research 
capability as firms’ patent stock for the previous three years. R&D spending is scaled by 
sales, which is often called R&D intensity. 
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We adjusted firms’ nominal sales to base year 1990, using Producer Price Index from 
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics for the pharmaceutical industry. We use sales here as a 
control variable for firm size, so we use contemporaneous value of sales. Following 
Penner-Hahn and Shaver (2005), we use the sum of patent counts in the last three years as 
a measure of firms’ underlying research capabilities. We use last three-year period is to 
capture recent research skill while reducing the effects of random, extreme event in certain 
years.8 
As a general measure of the outcome of firms’ operations, firm performance could 
be affected by all aspects, including firms’ resource, strategy, management, and 
environment. Using a model which cannot capture all the important factors that affects firm 
performance could generate many bias and problems to the estimation. To deal with this 
problem, we employ the dynamic panel model using all the past information of firm 
performance as the instrument.   
For testing Hypothesis 2: 
 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑀𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 +  𝜖𝑖,𝑡 (3) 
where profit is the measure of profitability, IND is the indicator for international 
innovation, and MA is the dummy variable for M&A.  
The lagged dependent variable, also acts as an important control variable here. It 
controls at least two types of factors: (1) possible persistence in the intertemporal path of 
profit; (2) omitted firm-specific time-varying factors that might affect the intertemporal 
                                                 
8 Penner-Hahn and Shaver (2005) tested that their results were not sensitive to the length of period. 
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path of profit. Therefore, our models are dynamic panel models. Since the lagged 
dependent variable is necessarily correlated with the idiosyncratic error, strict erogeneity 
in the regression is violated. Commonly used static panel data techniques such as fixed 
effects estimators would be inconsistent. To deal with this problem, we used the most 
popular Arellano-Bond estimator for the dynamic panel model, which is a generalized 
method of moments (GMM) estimator.  
M&A could have a significant influence on firms’ financial and economic 
performance, knowledge stock and research capability. For example, a firm might acquire 
another firm mainly for its technology. M&A also bring changes to the ownership of 
patents. Therefore, we have a dummy for M&A if it happened in the previous year, given 
that the effects might occur with some delay. Although the firms in our sample are all top 
firms, in the pharmaceutical industry, the size of the firms varies significantly. Therefore, 
we also include the number of employees as the measure for firm size.  
We use clustering errors for all models in the paper. For panel data, where 
observations can be grouped into clusters, model errors might be uncorrelated across 
cluster but correlated within cluster, therefore, controlling for within-cluster error 
correlation is needed. Failing to control for within-cluster error correlation can lead to 
smaller standard errors, narrow confidence intervals, large t-statistics, and low p-values 
(Cameron and Miller, 2015). Therefore, clustering errors is applied to every model and 
estimation where feasible. 
For linear regression model, the traditional way to control for clustered errors is to 
estimate a model specified for the within-cluster error correlation, and then estimate the 
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original model by feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) rather than ordinary least 
squares (OLS). However, the model only generates valid statistical inference, and more 
efficient estimates under the strong assumption that the model for within-cluster error 
correlation is correctly specified. (Cameron and Miller, 2015). 
A more recent method to control for clustered errors is to estimate the regression 
model limited or no control for within-cluster error correlation, and then obtain “cluster-
robust” standard errors. For the fixed-effects estimator in linear panel models, the cluster-
robust standard errors are provided by Arellano (1987). The method was incorporated into 
Stata by Rogers (1993). When using the Arellano-Bond estimator, it is required to test 
whether the remaining error 𝑈𝑖𝑡 it is serially correlated. Generally, including fixed-effects 
at cluster level does not control for all the within-cluster correlation of the errors. It is 
standard to test whether it is sufficient to estimate without cluster-specific fixed-effects. 
We will discuss these tests in the estimation part. Even though pharmaceutical firms in our 
sample are all top firms in the same industry, they still vary greatly in size, profitability, 
and business lines. Therefore, we do cluster by firms. 
1.6 Estimation Results 
1.6.1 International innovation and innovation performance 
Due to the nature of the dependent variable, we estimate the models using Poisson 
and Negative Binomial regression method for panel data. In Table 4, we list both fixed and 
random effect estimation results for the two methods. The four indicators are shown to 
have different impacts on patent production. IND1 has coefficients all negative, and none 
of them are significant. Therefore, it is hard to conclude that IND1 has impacts on patent 
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production. IND2 has two coefficients positive and two negative, with only one of the 
positive significant. Therefore, we can only conclude that IND2 might have positive impact 
on patent production.  The coefficients of IND3 have two positive and two negative 
coefficients with the positive ones significant, indicating that experience in international 
innovation has some positive impacts on innovation. All the coefficients for IND4 is 
significant and positive so width of the knowledge pool matter the most for innovation. 
Combining the impact of the four indicators, we conclude that international innovation 
would improve firms’ innovation performance. Working with more countries and widening 




Table 5 - Estimation Results for Model 1 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES pat pat pat pat pat pat pat pat 








pstock 0.000749*** 0.000749*** 0.000732*** 0.000730*** 0.000748*** 0.000747*** 0.000738*** 0.000733***  
(7.05e-05) (7.04e-05) (0.000171) (0.000195) (7.28e-05) (7.26e-05) (0.000158) (0.000144) 
L.rd_intensity -0.00268 -0.00262 -0.00176 -0.00163 -0.00268 -0.00262 -0.00175 -0.00163  
(0.00242) (0.00237) (0.00356) (0.00514) (0.00242) (0.00237) (0.00267) (0.00329) 
L.ind1 0.00487 0.00500 -0.00538 -0.0103 
    
 
(0.0362) (0.0362) (0.0314) (0.0289) 
    
L.ind2 
    
-0.0169 -0.0172 0.0729* 0.0649      
(0.0688) (0.0691) (0.0407) (0.0490) 
L.ind3 
        
         
L.ind4 
        
         
L.sale_real -3.66e-05*** -3.69e-05*** -2.22e-05* -2.48e-05** -3.63e-05*** -3.65e-05*** -2.36e-05* -2.60e-05**  
(9.64e-06) (9.60e-06) (1.19e-05) (9.80e-06) (9.59e-06) (9.55e-06) (1.36e-05) (1.11e-05) 
L.ma 0.00183 0.00175 0.0203** 0.0195** 0.00212 0.00204 0.0189 0.0183**  





1.403*** 1.425***    
(0.164) (0.151) 
  
(0.132) (0.128)          
Observations 834 833 834 833 834 833 834 833 
Num of firms 61 60 61 60 61 60 61 60 
Log-
likelihood 
-7599 -7141 -3447 -2996 -7598 -7140 -3444 -2994 





 Table 6 (continued) 
  (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
VARIABLES pat pat pat pat pat pat pat pat 








pstock 0.000750*** 0.000750*** 0.000732*** 0.000726*** 0.000654*** 0.000655*** 0.000541*** 0.000552***  
(7.09e-05) (7.07e-05) (0.000164) (0.000125) (8.25e-05) (8.22e-05) (0.000132) (0.000162) 
L.rd_intensity -0.00272 -0.00266 -0.00159 -0.00149 -0.00261 -0.00254 -0.00157 -0.00146  
(0.00246) (0.00241) (0.00272) (0.00267) (0.00232) (0.00228) (0.00379) (0.00305) 
L.ind1 
        
         
L.ind2 
        
         
L.ind3 -0.0151 -0.0146 0.173*** 0.160** 
    
 
(0.102) (0.103) (0.0645) (0.0762) 
    
L.ind4 
    
0.147*** 0.145*** 0.275*** 0.253***      
(0.0464) (0.0460) (0.0420) (0.0466) 
L.sale_real -3.58e-05*** -3.60e-05*** -3.10e-05*** -3.33e-05*** -3.76e-05*** -3.78e-05*** -3.02e-05** -3.21e-05***  
(9.16e-06) (9.17e-06) (1.12e-05) (1.27e-05) (9.10e-06) (9.05e-06) (1.18e-05) (1.09e-05) 
L.ma 0.00241 0.00231 0.0128 0.0124 -0.00188 -0.00193 0.00550 0.00586  





1.496*** 1.515***    
(0.156) (0.122) 
  
(0.115) (0.138)          
Observations 834 833 834 833 834 833 834 833 
Number of 
firms 
61 60 61 60 61 60 61 60 
Log-
likelihood 
-7598 -7140 -3434 -2985 -7402 -6948 -3418 -2972 
Chi2 764 137.6 65.56 63.33 893 182.3 165.1 100 
Robust standard errors in parentheses    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
Notes: The models are estimated using the Arellano-Bond estimator by Arellano and Bond (1991) and implemented by STATA 13 by Roodmand 
(2009). Robust cluster errors (clustered by firm) are reported in braces. Robust clustered standard errors are implemented by STATA 13 Roger (1994). 
Year dummies were used in each model. Instrument sets of lagged depend variable (GMM style) and all other right-hand-side variables (IV style). The 
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following tests are applied: 1. The Hansen test as a test of erogeneity and validity of instrument subsets; (Since we are using robust clustered standard 
errors, Sargan test is inappropriate.) 2. AR(2) test as a test for second-order serial correlation, required by suing the Arellano-Bond estimator; 3. The 
Wald test with the null hypothesis that all the coefficients except the constant are zero. All tests are reported by their p-values for convenience.
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1.6.2 International innovation and financial performance 
Estimation results for financial performance are presented in Table 5. The models 
are estimated using the Arellano-Bond Estimator for dynamic panel data models. The profit 
measure has very significant coefficients across all models, so the profit consistence is 
statistically confirmed. Indicator 2, 3 and 4 have significant positive effects on profits, with 
IND4 having magnitude and IND2 having the highest significance, while Indicator 1 don’t 
have significant impacts. Combining the impacts of the four indicators, we can easily 
conclude that international innovation would increase profit. All the models for the 
financial performance well pass the tests of overidentification constraints and serial 
correlation. This is generally consistent with the finding of the impacts of international 
innovation on innovation performance. Working with more countries and experience create 
more profits for the firms, while volume of the international innovation does not seem to 
be as important as the other two. This confirms our argument about the relationship 
between the impact son two types of performance. That is, the main channel of impact of 
internationalization of innovation of financial performance is through increase in research 
capability and productivity. 
 
 38 
Table 7 - Estimation Results for Model 2 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
VARIABLES profit1 profit1 profit1 profit1 profit2 profit2 profit2 profit2 profit3 profit3 profit3 profit3 
             
L.profit1 0.426*** 0.415*** 0.392*** 0.397*** 
        
 
(0.0916) (0.0933) (0.115) (0.0996) 
        
L.profit2 
    
0.512*** 0.513*** 0.477*** 0.474*** 
    
     
(0.125) (0.130) (0.153) (0.145) 
    
L.profit3 
        
0.270** 0.269** 0.273** 0.270** 
         
(0.130) (0.130) (0.130) (0.131) 
L.ind1 0.0322 
   
0.0415* 
   
2.316 
   
 
(0.0242) 
   
(0.0217) 
   
(1.859) 




   
0.0365 





   
(0.0391) 






   
0.103** 
   
-1.177 
 
   
(0.0434) 
   
(0.0442) 




   
0.174** 
   
0.197 
   
-0.910 
    
(0.0860) 
   
(0.130) 
   
(3.229) 
L.ma 0.00611 0.00540 0.00500 0.000273 0.00220 0.00223 0.000151 -0.00469 -0.0546 -0.0329 0.00652 0.0127 
 
(0.00374) (0.00395) (0.00348) (0.00456
) 
(0.00269) (0.00273) (0.00228) (0.00565
) 

























(0.0130) (0.0130) (0.0227) (0.0755
) 
Constant -0.0209 -0.0103 0.0623* 0.0769 0.00146 0.00338 0.0919** 0.111** -5.855 -6.164 -7.573 -6.926 
 
(0.0518) (0.0508) (0.0366) (0.0468) (0.0603) (0.0579) (0.0407) (0.0454) (5.198) (5.139) (6.695) (6.219) 
             
Observations 906 906 906 906 908 908 908 908 873 873 873 873 
Number of firms 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 
Wald test (p-value) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
AR(2)  
(p-value) 
0.374 0.329 0.288 0.439 0.721 0.618 0.577 0.775 0.938 0.794 0.670 0.670 
Hansen test (p-value) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
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*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: For each indicator, the model is estimated using Poisson estimator Random Effect (RE) and Fix Effect (FE), and Negative Binomial Estimator 
Random Effect (RE) and Fixed Effect (FE). Robust cluster errors are reported in braces except for Poisson FE with robust standard errors. All constants 
are omitted. Log-likelihood test with null hypothesis that some arbitrary group of k coefficients in the model is equal to zero, are applied. The Wald test 
with null hypothesis that all the coefficients except constant are zeros, are applied.
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1.6.3 Robustness Check 
We also examine the impacts of internationalization of innovation through some 
variations of the two main models as robustness check. First, as mentioned earlier, we are 
able to define different types of firms based on the values of the indicators of international 
innovation. In one of the variation of Model 1, we include dummy variables for firms 
identified as “winner”, “slow starter”, and “quick start”. Although none of coefficients for 
the dummy variables are found to be positive the significance of the coefficients for 
indicators improved a bit. The estimation results can be found in the Appendix.  
Second, since there are several powerhouse countries in the terms of the international 
innovation and biotechnology development, the country where the firm comes form might 
also have significant impacts on the financial and innovation performance. Therefore, we 
have dummy variables added to the estimation to identify the country when the firms come 
from. However, the coefficients on these variables were not found to be significant, nor did 
the inclusion of these variables have benefits on other parts of the models. The reasons 
behind this might be that the firms in the sample are mainly form these “powerhouse” 
countries and all of them are large multi-national firms, which have several competitive 
R&D centers indifferent locations, as discussed in Gassman and Van Zediwitz (1999). The 
estimation results are not included in the paper.  
Thirdly, although all firms are from the pharmaceutical industry, there are commonly 
two types of firms in the industry: (1) biotechnology firms focusing on research and 
development, and (2) life sciences firms focusing on additional development and the 
marketing of resulting products, as discussed in many studies (e.g. Reuer et al, 2002; 
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Robinson and Stuart, 2007; Sturt et al, 2007). We obtain additional information from 
Bloomberg on the business lines of the firms in our sample None of them are identified as 
primary involved in the biotechnology, but some of the them partly involved in 
biotechnology. Therefore, this should not matter much for our sample. We added a dummy 
variable for those biotechnology firms. As expected, it didn’t have significant coefficients, 
nor did it help with investigating other impact. The estimation results are not included in 
the paper. 
Finally, since our indicators measure different aspects of the internationalization of 
innovation and the correlation between them is not very high due to the difference in the 
definition. We also tried a variation of the estimation by including all the indicators in one 
model. However, the results are very clear. Even though the indicators are different by 
definition and correlation, it still measures the same phenomenon.  Almost all the indicators 
are insignificant. The significance of other variables is also affected. The estimation results 
are included in the Appendix. 
1.7 Conclusions 
Using patents data for relatively large multinational pharmaceutical firms, we build 
four indicators to measure the internationalization of innovation. Combining the patents 
data with the financial data of the firms enables us to estimate the effects of international 
innovation on firms’ financial and innovation performance. We find evidence for positive 
impact of international innovation on firms’ financial performance. Working with more 
countries, or having a wider knowledge pool, is more important when firms would like to 
create more profit through international innovation. We also find that internationalization 
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of innovation would help firms to improve their innovation performance in terms of patent 
production. Experience in international innovation is more important in the process than 
other aspects.  
Our study has three main limitations. One of the limitation is on the measurements. 
The measures of internationalization of innovations in this study are limited by the patent 
data we have. Measures based on more detailed patent data or other types of data can give 
us more insights into the question and produce more robust results. The measure for 
innovation performance is patent counts. Although this is a widely used measure of 
innovation, we cannot measure the quality or value of the innovation by simply using patent 
counts. The measure can be improved by adding quality components. For example, use 
citation-weighted patent counts. 
Another limitation is on impact analysis. Increasing innovation outcomes are only 
one of the channels through which the internationalization of innovation affects the 
profitability of the firms. Other channels might include marketing, cooperation 
management, and environment risk. Only by combing with the effects of other channels 
can we completely show the effects of internationalization of innovation on firms’ 
profitability. Therefore, further research can focus on the effects of other channels.  
The other limitation is on the generalization of results. All our results are based on 
data of large pharmaceutical firms. Beside industry specifics, pharmaceutical industry is 
an R&D intensive industry as mentioned earlier. Therefore, the results might be different 
for other industries or for smaller firms. 
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In addition, for potential “incidental parameters problem” in the fixed effect Negative 
binomial regression models, we have noticed several options to deal with this type of 
problem. We will address this potential bias later on.  
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APPENDIX B. ROBUSTNESS CHECK 
B.1 Firm type 
Model 1:  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES pat pat pat pat pat pat pat pat 
















pstock 0.000843*** 0.000824*** 0.000845*** 0.000826*** 0.000842*** 0.000820*** 0.000589*** 0.000592***  
(0.000180) (0.000147) (0.000280) (0.000162) (0.000160) (0.000192) (0.000123) (0.000138) 
L.rd_intensity -0.00134 -0.00125 -0.00138 -0.00130 -0.00128 -0.00121 -0.00129 -0.00121  
(0.00323) (0.00462) (0.00271) (0.00277) (0.00263) (0.00320) (0.00214) (0.00271) 
L.ind1 -0.00230 -0.0112 
      
 
(0.0464) (0.0462) 




    
   
(0.0786) (0.0911) 
    
L.ind3 
    
0.202** 0.197** 
  




      
0.307*** 0.286***        
(0.0804) (0.0794) 
L.sale_real -2.12e-05 -2.65e-05* -2.28e-05* -2.78e-05* -3.52e-05*** -4.09e-05*** -3.40e-05*** -3.82e-05***  
(1.36e-05) (1.40e-05) (1.30e-05) (1.50e-05) (1.21e-05) (1.29e-05) (1.28e-05) (9.01e-06) 
L.ma -0.000931 9.55e-06 -0.000464 0.000285 -0.0108 -0.00980 -0.0117 -0.0101  
(0.0170) (0.0164) (0.0154) (0.0150) (0.0130) (0.0139) (0.0206) (0.0171) 
Constant 1.347*** 1.388*** 1.381*** 1.419*** 1.489*** 1.538*** 1.527*** 1.559***  
(0.198) (0.155) (0.158) (0.157) (0.131) (0.183) (0.142) (0.152)          
Observations 606 604 606 604 606 604 606 604 
Number of firms 56 54 56 54 56 54 56 54 
Log-likelihood -2369 -1984 -2367 -1983 -2356 -1973 -2349 -1967 
Chi2 33.51 48.81 20.38 43.48 45.80 47.03 102.4 71.27 
Robust standard errors in parentheses    
 
 52 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
Note: For each indicator, the model is estimated using Poisson estimator Random Effect (RE) and Fix Effect (FE), and Negative Binomial Estimator Random Effect (RE) 
and Fixed Effect (FE). Robust cluster errors are reported in braces except for Poisson FE with robust standard errors. All constants are omitted. Log-likelihood test with 
null hypothesis that some arbitrary group of k coefficients in the model is equal to zero, are applied. The Wald test with null hypothesis that all the coefficients except 





(1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES profit1 profit1 profit1 profit1 
L.profit1 0.452*** 0.424*** 0.421*** 0.373***  
(0.0821) (0.0814) (0.103) (0.0916) 
L.profit2 
    
     
L.profit3 
    
     
L.ind1 0.0409* 
   
 
(0.0219) 
















   
0.196***     
(0.0637) 
L.ma 0.0124*** 0.0105** 0.00997** -0.00674  
(0.00443) (0.00483) (0.00411) (0.00647) 
firm_winner 0.0144 -0.000468 0.0231* -0.0496*  
(0.0160) (0.0174) (0.0138) (0.0280) 
firm_slowstarter -0.0704 -0.0433 0.0298 -0.0388  
(0.0464) (0.0419) (0.0443) (0.0357) 
firm_quickstarter -0.0653* -0.0451 0.0253 -0.0662  
(0.0353) (0.0392) (0.0590) (0.0407) 
Constant -0.0291** -0.0375* -0.0767** -0.0217  
(0.0148) (0.0204) (0.0331) (0.0191) 
Observations 929 929 929 929 
Number of firms 61 61 61 61 
Wald test (p-value) 0 0 0 0 
AR(2) (p-value) 0.709 0.653 0.586 0.756 
Hansen test (p-value) 1 1 1 1 
Robust standard errors in parentheses    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    Notes: The models are estimated using the Arellano-Bond estimator by 
Arellano and Bond (1991) and implemented by STATA 13 by Roodmand (2009). Robust cluster errors 
(clustered by firm) are reported in braces. Robust clustered standard errors are implemented by STATA 13 
Roger (1994). Year dummies were used in each model. Instrument sets of lagged depend variable (GMM 
style) and all other right-hand-side variables (IV style). The following tests are applied: 1. The Hansen test 
as a test of erogeneity and validity of instrument subsets; (Since we are using robust clustered standard errors, 
Sargan test is inappropriate.) 2. AR(2) test as a test for second-order serial correlation, required by suing the 
Arellano-Bond estimator; 3. The Wald test with the null hypothesis that all the coefficients except the 




B.2 Including all indicators 
Model 1 
  (1) 
VARIABLES pat 
    
pstock 0.000645***  
(8.74e-05) 
L.rd_intensity -0.00208  
(0.00196) 
L.ind1 0.0534  
(0.0489) 
L.ind2 -0.00283  
(0.0646) 
L.ind3 0.0674  
(0.110) 
L.ind4 0.179***  
(0.0542) 
L.sale_real -4.87e-05***  
(7.97e-06) 
L.ma -0.0209  
(0.0193)   
Observations 606 




Robust standard errors in parentheses 





  (1) 
VARIABLES profit1 
    
L.profit1 0.332***  
(0.111) 
L.ind1 -0.0141  
(0.0226) 
L.ind2 -0.00246  
(0.0695) 
L.ind3 0.0576  
(0.0486) 
L.ind4 0.146  
(0.0893) 
L.ma -0.00552  
(0.00867) 
L.emp -0.000448  
(0.00161) 
Constant -0.0493  
(0.0680)   
Observations 674 
Number of firms 56 
Wald test (p-value) 0 
AR(2) (p-value) 0.325 
Hansen test (p-value) 1 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 






CHAPTER 2. IMPACT OF UNCERTAINTY ON INNOVATION AND 
INVESTMENTS IN THE PHARMACEUTICALS INDUSTRY 
2.1 Introduction 
The theoretical and empirical literature on uncertainty reveals that important aspects 
of firms’ decisions can be affected by uncertainty about market conditions. The literature 
on uncertainty has investigated that uncertainty could arise from a wide range of factors, 
including demand, prices, input costs, cash flow, project returns, technology, and policies.  
The effects of uncertainty have also been studied extensively in the literature, especially 
for the effects of uncertainty on investments. Theory on this topic identifies four channels 
through which uncertainty may affect firms’ investments. These include the real options, 
which predicts that uncertainty increase the value of waiting for the irreversible capital 
(Pindyck, 1991; Dixit, 1992; Dixit & Pindyck, 1994); information asymmetry between 
lenders and borrower, which predicts that under uncertainty, the credit may flow to specific 
categories of business (Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1990); risk aversion of firms (Appelbaum 
and Katz, 1986; Hartman, 1976); and the convexity of the marginal product of capital, 
which predicts that increases in price uncertainty may increase a firm’s current investment, 
due to the convexity of the marginal revenue product of capital function with respect to 
price (Abel, 1983).  To summarize, despite the last channel, all the other three channels 
investigated recently have predicted a negative relationship between uncertainty and 
investments. As we will discuss in detail in the next section, most empirical studies on the 
effects of uncertainty on firm investments have been using disaggregated U.S. and 
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European manufacturing data and have similar results that uncertainty generally decrease 
investments. 
As a particularly relevant example of irreversible capital, R&D expenditure is also 
under the influence of uncertainty. As uncertainty increases, firms might choose to wait for 
new information instead of hiring research personnel and purchase research facilities as 
planned. Therefore, uncertainty could also decrease firms’ R&D expenditure. As 
innovation is the output of R&D expenditure, although the results of research projects are 
often unpredictable, decrease in input of innovation would definite affect the output. 
Therefore, from this point of view, the relationship between uncertainty and innovation 
should also be negative.  
Receiving the literature on uncertainty, the impacts on investment is the topic that 
has the longest discussion. The core models and main theories (MacDonald and Seigal, 
1986; Dixit, 1989; Dixit and Pindyck, 1994, etc.) in the uncertainty literature all come from 
literature examining the impact of uncertainty on firms’ decision variables related to 
investment. The work on R&D expenditure and patent were down much later. Therefore, 
in this paper, the objective is to examine the effects of uncertainty on first on investment, 
then R&D expenditure, and innovation, respectively, using the data on firms in the 
pharmaceutical industry. The paper is organized as the following: Section 2 summarizes 
the related literature on the effect of uncertainty on investment, R&D expenditure, and 
innovation, and raise the research question; Section 3 discusses the data sources and 
treatment; Section 4 describes the definition of the measures for uncertainty; Section 5 
discusses the empirical strategies towards the research questions; Section 6 discusses the 
estimation results; Section 7 concludes the study and discusses about possible limits. 
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2.2 Literature Review 
As mentioned earlier, the literature on the impacts of uncertainty started and are 
centered at the impact on investment. Then studies on the impact on R&D expenditure and 
innovation were built on the theory and empirical studies on the impact of uncertainty on 
investment. As R&D expenditure is a type of investment, at the meantime, the input for 
innovation, starting from the impacts on investment allow us to start from general theories 
of uncertainty before going into specific empirical impact analysis. Therefore, in this 
section, we discuss three topics related to uncertainty and innovation. We start with a 
discussion of the relationship between uncertainty and general investment. We then will 
narrow down to R&D investment.  In the last part, we discuss the relationship between 
uncertainty and innovation output. As R&D investment is a type of investment and the 
input for innovation output, the three topics are closely related. As the theoretical models 
of uncertainty and investment form the base of the discussion, we start with investment. 
Discussion on each theoretical model is followed by relevant empirical studies. 
2.2.1 Uncertainty and investment 
An extensive literature focuses on the relationship between uncertainty and 
investment. In this section, we discuss three main theoretical models related to real-option, 
financial constraints driven by information asymmetry, and risk-preferences.  
2.2.1.1 Real-options 
A considerable literature has explored the relationship between uncertainty and 
investment under the real-options framework. In the theoretical literature, McDonald and 
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Siegel (1986), Dixit (1989), and Dixit and Pindyck (1994) assume that costs remain 
unchanged, but market demand fluctuates, therefore the uncertainty is from the demand 
side and sunk costs imply an option value of waiting. The simulation results in Dixit (1989) 
and Dixit and Pindyck (1994) show that even small amounts of uncertainty are sufficient 
to depress investment and entry.  
Pindyck (1993) examines the effect of uncertainty from costs, including input costs 
and technical costs. The simulation results show that the optional capital stock decreases 
with input cost uncertainty, but increases with technical uncertainty. Since the optional 
capital is more sensitive to input cost uncertainty, they have similar results to those 
obtained under demand-side uncertainty that negative effects from the input cost 
uncertainty dominants the positive effects from technical uncertainty, therefore, the overall 
effect is negative.  
There are also other models under the real-options framework. For example, 
Kulatilaka and Perotti (1998), Folta and O’Brien (2004), Oriani (2007), and Oriani and 
Sobrero (2008) found an inverted U-shaped relationship between demand uncertainty and 
R&D investment, because frontier technologies changes in future periods make firms 
consider waiting for technology evolvement before increase R&D investment to create an 
option to switch.  
2.2.1.2 Information asymmetry and financing constraints 
Greenwald and Stiglitz (1990) investigated how informational asymmetries between 
borrowers and lenders can tighten financial constraints for certain types of borrowers. They 
argued that increased uncertainty about profitability could increase the risk of bankruptcy, 
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and firms relying primarily on credits cannot issue equity to absorb the risk, therefore, they 
can only respond by lowering their investment. 
Delli Gatti et al. (2003) extended the framework of Greenwald and Stiglitz (1990). 
They showed that if the financial conditions can affect capital investments and entry and 
exit, greater uncertainty would widen the informational asymmetries, increase the 
likelihood of bankruptcy, exacerbates financing constraints, and affect firms’ decision on 
a wide range of variables including investments. 
In contrast to the agency-based models mentioned above, Campbell and Cochrane 
(1999) demonstrated that greater macroeconomic uncertainty leads to countercyclical 
variation of volatility and risk premia, which results in a negative correlation between 
uncertainty and key decision variables such investment. 
2.2.1.3 Risk-preferences 
One of the oldest explanation on the relationship between uncertainty and 
investments is based on risk preferences. There are two strands of literature on this topic. 
The traditional one follows the assumption that risk and return are positively correlated. 
Therefore, firms with greater risk aversion will produce less and changing their input-mix 
(Sandmo, 1971; Hartman, 1972, 1973, 1976; Appelbaum and Katz, 1989; Gul, 1991; 
Aizenman and Marion, 1999). Ghosal (1991, 1995) examined these models empirically, 
finding that greater uncertainty alters the input-mix and results in lower capital-labor ratios. 
The other strand of literature challenges the traditional linear relationship between 
uniform risk-references and decision-making. For example, Bowman (1980, 1982) raised 
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a negative risk-return relationship in some industries. Based on Kahneman and Tversky’s 
(1979) prospect theory, this line of literature complicates the predictions on the effects of 
uncertainty on investment. 
In summary, the literature on the effect of uncertainty on investment generally finds 
negative effects. As the purpose of this paper, we would also test the hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: Uncertainty is expected to have a negative effect on investment. 
2.2.1.4 Uncertainty and Innovation 
In the theoretical analysis of the relationship between uncertainty and R&D 
investment, Abel et al. (1996) demonstrated that investment decisions involve the 
following two options. The reversibility option captures the value of opportunities and 
costs when disinvestment happened in the future, which increases the incentive for current 
investment when future returns are uncertain. On the other hand, the expandability option 
captures the value of opportunities and costs when investment happened in the future, 
which decreases the incentive for current investment when future returns are uncertain. 
Thus, their model shows that the overall effect of uncertainty on investment depend on the 
nature of the options, which is partly determined by the type of the capital investment. The 
R&D investment we discuss in this paper is typically considered as investments that have 
very small reversibility, but considerable expandability. Since R&D investments are 
mainly used for the salaries of R&D personnel, setting up and running research 
laboratories, and purchases of equipment, the R&D investments are often characterized as 
largely irreversible (e.g. Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). Therefore, for R&D investments, the 
negative effects from expandability would dominant under uncertainty. 
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Bloom (2007) explores this topic by extending existing models to incorporate time 
varying uncertainty. He showed that high uncertainty reduces the responsiveness of R&D 
to changes in demand and increase the persistence of R&D over time. The main purpose 
of Czarnitzki and Toole (2011) was to investigate the mechanism through which patents 
stimulate R&D investment. Part of their finding using the data of German manufacturing 
firms from 1995 to 2001 is that firm-level R&D investment decreases in response to higher 
levels of uncertainty. Summarizing the literature on the effects of uncertainty on firms 
R&D expenditure, we can find that they all have investigate the following hypothesis. 
Another strand of literature investigates the relationship between competition and 
R&D investment incorporating uncertainties in the models, which typically known as 
patent race theory. Early work on the patent race theory using one-step static models, 
focuses on the effects of technologies uncertainty, which refers to the differences in 
efficiency and timing of the invention discovery process (Dasgupta and Stiglitz, 1980; 
Gilbert and Newbery, 1982). There are also studies focusing on dynamic uncertainty alone, 
which refers to the change in firms’ incentives to Invest in R&D as the race unfolds 
(Fudenberg et al., 1983; Harris and Vickers, 1985). Later work combines the two types of 
uncertainty into the patent races under dynamic multi-stage structure (Grossman and 
Shapiro, 1987; Harris and Vickers, 1987). However, empirical evidence on the patent race 
theories has been inconclusive. (Zizzo, 2002) 
Summarizing the literature, we examine the relationship of uncertainty and R&D 
investment through the following hypothesis. 




Theoretical discussion on the relationship between uncertainty and innovation has 
been going on for a long time. There are two strands of literature tied to this. One is the 
debate of the sign of the effect of uncertainty on innovation. A traditional argument is that 
the uncertainty in the market is likely to compel incumbent firms to secure their position 
through innovation (e.g. Myers and Marquis, 1969, Miller and Friesen, 1982, Özsomer et 
al., 1997, Bhidé, 2003, Freel, 2005), while the converse argument is consistent with our 
discussion of negative effect of uncertainty on R&D investment, that since the uncertainty 
would lead to decrease in R&D investment, so would it lead to decrease in innovation as 
the output. The other strands of literature discuss the problem by reversing the two sides, 
arguing that innovation create uncertainty. The most famous argument is the “Creative 
Destruction” by Joseph Schumpeter, that innovation would bring revolutionary economic 
changes, which leads to uncertainty. Therefore, due to the complexity of the relation 
between uncertainty and innovation, it is hard to predict the sign of the effect.  
Compared to the extensive empirical studies on the effects of uncertainty on R&D 
investment decision, only limited number of empirical studies investigate the effect of 
uncertainty on patent out. Freel (2005) extended the investigation on the effects of 
uncertainty on innovation to differences in the effects for firm size and industry. From a 
survey of English small- and medium-sized enterprises, he found that for manufacturing 
industry, higher levels of innovation are associated with higher perceptions of supplier 
uncertainty, while for service industry, higher levels of innovation are associated with 
higher perceptions of human resource uncertainty. Here, we follow the discussion on the 
effect of uncertainty on investment. Since innovation, measured as patents here, is 
 
 64 
generally considered to be the output of R&D investment (Griliches, 1980, Pakes, 1985, 
we expected that: 
Hypothesis 3: Uncertainty has positive effects on innovation. 
2.3 Data 
To examine the effects of uncertainty on firms’ investments, R&D, and patents, we 
focus on the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries, defined by North American 
Industry Classification System (NAICS): 325411 – Medicinal and Botanical 
Manufacturing; 325412 – Pharmaceutical Preparation Manufacturing; and 541711 – 
Research and Development in Biotechnology. For convenience, in this paper, we refer 
firms in both industries as “pharmaceutical firms.” As firms in these industries are among 
the most intensive in R&D and patenting, and significant capital investments, they serve 
as an ideal sample to study the effects on uncertainty.  
2.3.1 Sample 
We include all top pharmaceutical firms in recent years. To get a listing of these 
firms, we referred to several online sources, including Current Partnering, PMLiVE, 
Contract Pharma and Wikipedia. Lists from these sources are all based on financial data 
after 2007 and include no more than 50 firms. We then combined them into a final list of 
big pharmaceutical firms in the U.S. and Europe. The top firms listed and used in this study 
include 172 firms worldwide. Since the study focuses on U.S and European firms and there 
are firms that we cannot find financial information, our final sample drops to 63 firms. The 
list can be found in Table A1 in the Appendix. 
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2.3.2 Patent data 
Patents are awards to firms’ research activities and are often linked to new 
technologies introduced the market. Following the common practice in the literature, we 
use patent numbers as a measure of innovation performance in this paper. Pharmaceutical 
industry, overall, has a very high patenting rate and patents are critical to a firm’s success 
(Scherer at al., 1959; Mansfield, 1986; Levin et al., 1987; Coad and Rao, 2008; Helmers 
and Roger, 2011; etc.). According to a survey by researchers at Carnegie-Mellon 
University in 1994 (Cohen et al., 2000), pharmaceutical firms reported that 78% of their 
business units filed for patents. In the literature, both patent applications and patent grants 
are used to count patent numbers. Due to the patenting process, there is a considerable time 
lag from filing to granting. Therefore, the patent application9 is a better measure of a firm’s 
innovation outcome. 
Our patent data are from PubWEST, which includes patents from United State Patent 
and Trademark Office (USPTO), European Patent Office (EPO), and Japan Patent Office 
(JPO)10 . We include only USPTO and EPO patents under corresponding pharmaceutical 
categories defined by IPC (International Patent Classification), which are A61K 
(Preparations for medical, dental, or toilet purposes) and C12N (Micro-organisms or 
                                                 
9 Generally, not all patent applications will be granted. One of the common reasons for the failure is that the 
patent authority does not think the invention is not innovative enough, so the patents grant is believed to be 
a better measure of innovation. To accommodate both the quality of the invention and the timing of the 
process, we use successful patent applications in our dataset.  
10 The JPO data provided by the PubWEST has only basic information with missing values for important 
fields, such as patent class, inventors, and the address of the inventors, so the JPO data is excluded from the 
sample. The other reason for the exclusion is that patent laws in U.S. and Europe are similar, while patent 
laws in Japan is much different. Therefore, every firm in our sample has patents from its home patent 
authority, and the patents are regulated by similar patent laws. These factors are very important for 
international patenting and international innovation. 
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enzymes; Compositions thereof; Propagating, preserving, or maintaining micro-organisms; 
Mutation or genetic engineering; Culture media).  
To include all the patents for each firm, we made queries using both the names of the 
parent company and its subsidiaries. Public listed firms in U.S. are required to submit 
filings every year about their finance and operation. Therefore, 10-K is the most updated 
source for firm’s subsidiaries. To simplify the procedure, we only use the most recent one, 
the 2012 10-K for U.S. firms.11 We referred to the 2012 10-K of most firms publicly traded 
in US for their subsidiaries information.  Subsidiaries information for other firms is from 
Mergent Online. We also manually update the ownership of the patents for some firms for 
years after mergers and acquisitions.  
2.3.3 Economic and Financial Data 
We collected the annual accounting data of publicly-traded pharmaceutical firms 
from the Compustat database. 12  Data on firms traded in USA and Canada are from 
Compustat North America, while data on other publicly traded firms are from Compustat 
Global. After matching firms on our list with those in the Compustat in the period from 
1990 to 2010, we have 63 firms left in the final sample.13   
2.3.4 Other Data Issues 
                                                 
11 Due to the simplification, we are not able to have highly-accurate subsidiary information for each firm in 
each year. We assume that the change in subsidiaries are very small from year to year and firms will always 
keep patents under the name of the parent firm or existing subsidiaries unless they would like to sell their 
patents together with a subsidiary, which we do not capture in our data. 
12 R&D data from Compustat include a lot missing and abnormal values, therefore, we instead collected 
R&D expenditure data from the annual financial reports provided by MergentOnline. 
13 This number is comparable Roberts (1999), which had a sample of “42 firms that were in the top 40 
(according to U.S. pharmaceutical sales) in any one of the sampled year”, from 1977 to 1993. 
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Since our dataset comes from different data sources, we did more work to 
consistently combining data from different data sources together. Even though the two 
datasets from Compustat and PubWEST can be combined using corporate registration and 
identification information, inconsistences in year coverage exist between the two datasets. 
In other words, the starting year for a firm’s patent data, the starting year for a firm’s 
financial data, and the official or legal starting year for a firm might be different. After our 
manual treatment based on information from Bloomberg, Mergent Online, firm’s own 
websites, and Compustat, a firm might have a different starting year from the starting year 
of the study period for one of the following two reasons: (1) the firm was formed by 
merging with another firm; (2) the firm was separated from another firm (spin-off). 
Likewise, a firm’s ending year might be different from the ending year of the study period 
because it was later acquired by another firm.  
For patent data from PubWEST, some patents with US inventors have missing values 
in the inventor country field, but have values in the inventor state field. Therefore, the 
country information used in this study was in fact a combination of these two fields. 
2.4 Methodology 
2.4.1 Measures of uncertainty  
Uncertainty could arise from many factors. Economists have been studying factors 
including demand (Dixit 1989; Dixit and Pindyck, 1994), input costs (Pindyck, 1993), 
technical factors (Pindyck, 1993) and policy factors (Pindyck, 1993; Dixit and Pindyck, 
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1994, 1995).14 The empirical literature on uncertainty at firm level has used measures 
primarily based on profit, stock returns, productivity, or subjective forecasts from surveys 
(Jurado et al, 2015). Here we build our measures of uncertainty based on three of the most 
commonly used variables: sales, stock price, and profit. We use two most commonly-used 
methods to build the measures: using the residuals from forecasting equations and using 
the conditional variance.  
Measure 1: Sales-based measure 
First, we assume that firms predict future sales based on their own past sales and 
GDP growth, as shown in the specification below. Therefore, the predicted values represent 
the forecastable component, while the residuals represent the unpredictable, i.e. 
uncertainty. Using the residuals of the forecasting equations and using the conditional 
variance to construct uncertainty measures is common in the literature. Lensink et. al. 
(2001), for example, include a comprehensive overview of this literature and alternative 
frameworks that have been used in the literature for measuring uncertainty.  
The sales used here is real sales adjusted for inflation by PPI (Producer Price Index) 
for the pharmaceutical industry from Bureau of Labor Statistics. GDP as a gross measure 
of the whole economy, captures all the demand and supply effects, therefore, changes in 
GDP provide a good measure of macroeconomic uncertainty. Uncertainty measures based 
on GDP growth in different forms, have been widely used in the literature (Driver et al., 
2005; Asteriou and Price, 2005; Bloom, 2009). Since the firms in our sample is all big 
                                                 
14 There are also many studies about sources of uncertainty from the management point of view. Priem et al 
(2002) had a comprehensive review of studies on this topic and brought up a classification of uncertainty 
sources, which include “international competitive advantage”, “industry competition”, “production costs”, 
“human resources”, “government”, “societal change”. 
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multinational firms, the predication of the future economy of the firms should be based on 
the world-wide economic changes. Therefore, we used the OECD-wide GDP in the 
regression. Here we use the growth rate of GDP, which have been commonly used by the 
literature (e.g. Driver et al., 2005, Asteriou et al., 2005, and Bloom, 2009). The sales are 
the real sales adjusted for inflation by GDP deflator.  
We specify our forecasting model as following. As the baseline, we first use a 
second-order autoregressive AR(2), specified as following: 
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛾 + 𝛼1 ∙  𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼2  ∙  𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡−2
+ 𝛽1  ∙  𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 ∙  𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑡−2 +  ɛ𝑖,𝑡 (4)
 
Then the predicted values represent the forecastable component. The residuals: 
ɛ𝑖,?̂? = 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡 − 𝛾 − 𝛼1̂ ∙  𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡−1 − 𝛼2̂  ∙  𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡−2
−𝛽1  ∙  𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 ∙  𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑡−2 (5)
 
represent the unforecastable component. Since (ɛ_t ) ̂ can be either positive and 
negative, we use ɛ_t^2 as the measure of uncertainty for year t. Our data start from 1990, 
but we lost two years of observations due to taking lags. The measure starts from 1992, so 
does our estimation.  
An alternative way to use the residuals is to use the standard deviation of the residuals 
over five-year overlapping periods: 1992-1996, 1993-1997, …, 2006-2010. The standard 
deviation of the residuals over first five-year period 1992-1996 serve as the observation on 
uncertainty for the year 1997, so the estimation using this measure starts from 1997. Since 
the second measure have similar estimation results, we only show the results of the first 
measure in the paper, which we label as “UNCER1”. 
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Measure 2: Stock price-based measure 
In a country with active financial stock market, the stock price of a firm is assumed 
to capture the possible economic changes related to the firm forward looking of investors, 
or business confidence, therefore, the volatility of the stock price is a good measure of the 
broad uncertainty faced by the firm. Stock price have been used to construct measures of 
uncertainty in many studies (e.g. Bloom, 2009; Bloom et al., 2007; Greasley and Madsen, 
2006, and Stein and Stone, 2010). Here we scale the stock price divided by a stock market 
index. As mentioned earlier, to capture the uncertainty from the global market, we need a 
stock market index, which is based on the stocks from firms worldwide. Here we use the 
Dow Jones Global Index, which is based on more than 5500 companies around the world. 
Therefore, the uncertainty measure based on stock prices is calculated by the within-year 




where m denotes a specific month of the year, and I denote a specific firm. This 
procedure of within-year variance is common in the literature (e.g. Lensink et al., 2001). 
Since this variance is calculated from each year, the uncertainty measure is available for 
the whole sample period, from 1990 to 2010, and the estimation using this measure starts 
from 1990. 
Using the stock price and index, we also employ the forecasting model method15 and 
get a measure from the residuals, Similar to UNCER1, this measure also starts from 1992. 
                                                 
15 The forecasting model for the stock price does not include GDP growth variables. 
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Since the second measure using the forecasting model have the similar estimation results 
as the first measure using within-year variance, only the estimation results of the first 
measure are shown and discussed in the paper.  
Measure 3: Profit-based measure 
As sales, firms’ profit also fluctuates over the business cycle. Unpredictable 
component of the profit change is defined as uncertainty here. Using profit to measure 
uncertainty is consistent with prior work (Aizenman and Marion, 1999; Ghosal, 1991, 
1995, 1996; Ghosal and Loungani, 1996, 2000; Huizinga, 1993; Leahy and Whited, 1996). 
We employ the same forecasting model16 using profit growth rate to get another measure 
of uncertainty, which we label as “UNCER3”. The profit we use here, is the net profit 
margin, which equals net profit divided by sales. The uncertainty measures based on sales 
and profits measure similar uncertainty from the product market. The estimation results of 
the two types of measures are also close. We include only the measure based on sales, 
UNCER1, in the estimation part, and put the estimation results in the Appendix. 
Summary statistics for the three measures are shown in Table 7.  
Table 8 - Uncertainty Measures 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
uncer1 810 2.418592 22.28023 0 505.864 
uncer2 880 0.041208 0.141657 0.000227 1.918048 
uncer3 741 524.6574 8240.618 0 216805.2 
                                                 
16 The forecasting model for the profit does not include GDP growth variables. 
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2.4.2 Estimation Strategy 
Substantial literature involves estimation of the effects of uncertainty on firms’ 
decision variables, including investments, employment, inventories, R&D and so on. 
Following the popular practices in the literature, we employ different methods for 
estimating the effects of uncertainty: (1) dynamic panel model for Hypothesis 1 and 
Hypothesis 2, (2) negative binomial and Poisson estimator for Hypothesis 3.  
Firms’ investment and R&D expenditures are important decision variables. A 
substantial literature has been on estimation of the effects related to firms’ decision 
variables. Besides investment and R&D expenditure, there are also employment, inventory, 
and other variables (e.g., Eisner and Strotz, 1963, Sargent, 1978, Kennan, 1979, Hendry et 
al., 1983, and Jorgenson, 1986). Following the literature, we use a partial-adjustment 
framework to structure our empirical specification. The partial-adjustment framework 
model is based on a quadratic cost-minimizing framework where firms minimize 
disequilibrium and adjustment costs, when choosing optimal adjustments to the decision 
variable. The disequilibrium costs arise from loss of profit because the relevant decision 
variable is at a sub-optimal level. The adjustment costs arise from the firm’s temptation to 
align the actual quality of the relevant decision variable to its optimal level. Therefore, 
higher disequilibrium costs would motivate a firm to adjust the relevant decision variable 
faster, while high adjustment costs would motivate a firm to adjust more smoothly and 
slowly. In other words, the disequilibrium costs and adjustment costs act in opposite 
directions. This implies that the actual speed of the adjustment will be a weighted-average 
of the two countervailing forces. 
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Let a firm’s decision variable be Y, and Y* be the optimal (or equilibrium) value of 
Y. The partial-adjustment model is given by:  
𝑌𝑡 − 𝑌𝑡−1 = 𝜆(𝑌𝑡
∗ − 𝑌𝑡−1) (7) 
This means that the actual intertemporal adjustment of Y, (𝑌𝑡 − 𝑌𝑡−1) is typically a 
fraction 𝜆  (0 ≤ 𝜆 ≤ 1)  of the desired intertemporal adjustment (𝑌𝑡
∗ − 𝑌𝑡−1) . Thus, λ 
denotes the speed of response.  
After rewriting, we have:  
𝑌𝑡 = (1 − 𝜆)𝑌𝑡−1 + 𝜆𝑌𝑡
∗ (8) 
This means that the actual quality of Y is affect by both the last value of Y, and the 
optimal value of Y at time t. Y* is generally private information to the firm, therefore, 
cannot be observed from the outside. We model Y* as a function of a list of driving 
variables, denoted by X, and uncertainty, that is:  
𝑌∗ = 𝑓(𝑿, 𝑈𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑅) (9) 
where UNCER denotes uncertainty.  
After combining with the previous equation and rearranging, and including firm 
fixed-effects and year-time dummies, our estimation specification is:  
𝑌𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑿
′𝜷 + 𝛾𝑈𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝑖,𝑡 (10) 
where Y is net investment for Hypothesis 1, and R&D intensity for Hypothesis 2. The 
lagged variable, Y_(t-1) also act as an important control variable here. It controls at least 
two types of factors: (1) possible persistence in the intertemporal path of Y; (2) omitted 
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firm-specific time-varying factors that might affect the intertemporal path of Y. Therefore, 
our models are dynamic panel models. Since the lagged dependent variable is necessarily 
correlated with the idiosyncratic error, strict erogeneity in the regression is violated. 
Commonly used static panel data techniques such as fixed effects estimators would be 
inconsistent. To deal with this problem, we used the most popular Arellano-Bond estimator 
for the dynamic panel model, which is a generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator. 
Investment is scaled by the beginning-period capital stock, that is, 𝐼𝑡 𝐾𝑡−1⁄ . The 
investment, I is the “Capital Expenditures on Property, Plant and Equipment Schedule V” 
(Compustat item 30). The capital stock, K is the computed from the “Property, Plant and 
Equipment – Total (Gross)” (Compustat item 7) following the method in Hall (1990). The 
capital stock, K, is deflated by the capital investment deflator for “325 Chemical Products” 
industry reported in the “Capital and Related Measures from the Three-Digit Database, 
1987-2015” from Bureau of Labor Statistics. The deflator is applied at the calculated 
average age of the capital sock, based on the ratio of total accumulated depreciation 
(Compustat item 196) to current depreciation (Compustat item 14).17  
The depreciation rate for all types of assets for the U.S. “24 Chemicals and 
Chemical” industry from the EUKLEMS database (November 2009 release). Thus,  
𝐾𝑡 = 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑡(1 − 𝛿)
𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑡 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑡⁄  (11) 
where δ is the depreciation rate, age is the average age of the capital stock. 
                                                 
17 The calculation of the average capital age follows Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2003) and Bugamelli and 
Pagano (2004), which are slightly different from the method in Hall (1990). That is, 𝑎𝑔𝑒 =
min (𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚, 3 − 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘). 
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R&D intensity is the real R&D expenditure scaled by real sales. UNCER is 
uncertainty. X is the vector of control variables. Here, we include sales growth rate as the 
control for firm size, and year dummies. Investment data are scaled by capital stock. Sales 
data are adjusted to base year 1990, using Producer Price Index from U.S. Bureau of Labor 
Statistics for the pharmaceutical industry.  
The patent production function is widely used in patenting studies (e.g. Hall and 
Ziedonis, 2001; Hu and Jefferson, 2009). We specify our augmented patent production 
function as:  
𝐸(𝑃𝐴𝑇) = exp(𝑽′𝜷𝑽 + 𝑼𝑪
′𝜷𝑼) (12) 
where PAT is the count of patent applications 18 , the vector V stands for traditional 
explanatory variables in the patent production function, including R&D expenditures, firm 
size, research capability and other variables. UC is the uncertainty faced by the firm. 
Taking logarithm for both sides and specifying our estimation function as: 
ln(𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑖,𝑡) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑈𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 ln(𝑅&𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1)
+𝛽3𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡 (13)
 
where UC is still the measure of uncertainty, and u is the error term. 19   
Since the dependent variable is patent counts, we employ Poisson and Negative 
Binomial regression models, which are commonly used in studies of patent output (e.g. 
                                                 
18 Since PAT = 0 occurs, we have all the PAT added by 1, so PAT starts from 1, even though the firm did 
not file for a patent in that year. This would not affect the results much, because firms in our sample are all 
big firms in the industry with high volume of patent applications. The mean of PAT in our dataset is about 
70, and it has a variance of 132. 
19 Since zero values were found for some firms at some years, we added 1 to PAT, therefore, the patent 
number start from 1, and are suitable for logarithm. 
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Henderson and Cockburn, 1996; Hall and Ziedonis, 2001; Penner-Hahn and Shaver, 2005; 
Hu and Jefferson, 2009). For the fixed effect Negative Binomial regression models, there 
is a potential “incidental parameters problem”. We have noticed several options to deal 
with this type of problem. We will address this potential bias later on.  
We include R&D expenditure as the input for innovation. R&D expenditure is a long-
term investment, which takes time to have impacts (Barker and Mueller, 2002). However, 
it is generally difficult to identify the lag structure of the impacts. Moreover, the lag 
structure is likely to be different among firms and projects. As discussed in Hall and 
Ziedonis (1995), due to “the high within-firm correlation of R&D spending over time”, the 
estimation results among R&D variables with different lag periods are “roughly the same”. 
So here we use one-year lagged R&D to be consist with other variables in the model. We 
measure research capability as firms’ patent stock for the previous three years. We also 
include sales as the control for firm size. 
We use clustering of errors for all models in the paper. For panel data, where 
observations can be grouped into clusters, model errors might be uncorrelated across 
cluster but correlated within cluster, therefore, controlling for within-cluster error 
correlation is needed. Failing to control for within-cluster error correlation can lead to 
misleading standard errors, with narrow confidence intervals, large t-statistics, and low p-
values. (Cameron and Miller, 2015). Therefore, clustering of errors is applied to every 
model and estimation as feasible. 
For linear regression model, the traditional way to control for clustered errors is to 
estimate a model specified for the within-cluster error correlation, and then estimate the 
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original model by feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) rather than ordinary least 
squares (OLS). However, the model only generates valid statistical inference, and more 
efficient estimates under the strong assumption that the model for within-cluster error 
correlation is correctly specified. (Cameron and Miller, 2015). A more recent method to 
control for clustered errors is to estimate the regression model limited or no control for 
within-cluster error correlation, and then obtain “cluster-robust” standard errors. For the 
fixed effects estimator in linear panel models, the cluster-robust standard errors are 
provided by Arellano (1987). The method was incorporated into Stata by Rogers (1994). 
When using the Arellano-Bond estimator, it is required to test whether the remaining error 
U_it is serially correlated. Generally, including fixed effects at cluster level does not 
control for all the within-cluster correlation of the errors. It is standard to test whether it is 
sufficient to estimate without cluster-specific fixed effects. We will discuss these tests in 
the estimation part. Even though pharmaceutical firms in our sample are all top firms in 
the same industry, they still vary greatly in size, profitability, and business lines. Therefore, 
we do cluster by firms. 




INV Investment Investment scaled by the beginning-of-period capital 
stock 
rd_real R&D in real 
values 
R&D spending adjusted by GDP deflator for OECD 
countries (base year 2010) 
rd_intensity R&D intensity R&D spending divided by sales 
sale_real Sales in real 
values 
Sales adjusted by GDP deflator for OECD countries 
(base year 2010) 
sale_growth Sales growth 
rate 
The growth rate of sales in real values 
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Table 10 (continued). 
gdp_oecd GDP of OECD 
countries 
The gross domestic product (GDP) for OECD 
countries 
gdp_growth The growth rate of 
GDP in OECD 
countries 
The growth rate of GDP for OECD countries 
PAT Patent application 
counts 
Counts of patent applications filed by a firm in a 
certain year 
pstock Patent stock The sum of patent application counts in the last 
three years as the measure for research capability 
UNCER1 Uncertainty measure 
based on sales-growth 
Created from the error term of the auto 
regression of sales growth rate (including GDP 
growth rate in the regressors). 
UNCER2 Uncertainty measure 
based on stock price 
Standard deviation of the 12-month ratio of 
stock price for a certain firm to market index 
UNCER3 Uncertainty measure 
net profit margin 
Created from the error term of the auto 
regression of the net profit margin 
Note: Lagged variables are not listed here. Lagged variables are simply the previous values of the variables 
listed here and are named by adding “L.” in front of the original variables. For example, L.sale_growth is the 
lagged value for sale_growth, i.e. the previous value of sales growth rate. If it is the two-year lagged, then 
the variable would begin with “L2.”. 
Definitions for all variables are listed in Table 8. Table 9 shows the summary 
statistics for our data. Patent numbers show considerable between-firm and within-firm 
variation. As a result, patent stock the measure of research capability, also varies 
considerable across firms and within a firm over time. For the three measures of 
uncertainty, they also have considerable variance. Note they also have different ranges 
which makes the interpretation of their coefficients different. Uncertainty measure three 
generally has better correlation with other variables. R&D expenditure naturally has high 
correlation with investments and sales. Patent numbers correlate more with R&D 
expenditure, then with sales. 
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Table 11 - Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 
pat 70.63862 132.0902 
pstock 227.1176 409.5573 
rd_real 994785 1793006 
rd_intensity 4499.957 31417.53 
INV 0.345604 0.487325 
sale_growtht-1 0.651609 3.450943 
 
2.5 Estimation Results 
2.5.1 Uncertainty and Investment 
Estimation results for Hypothesis 1 are shown in Table 3. The specification for each 
model is the same, just with different uncertainty measures. We include lagged invests, 
current and previous period uncertainty measures, and current and previous period sales 
growth rate. The positive and significant coefficient on lagged investment statistically 
confirms the persistent behavior of investment, which is known as lagged investment 
effect. Only the previous period sales growth rate has a significant coefficient, which shows 
a statistically significant and positive impact on investment. For Model 1, the uncertainty 
measure UNCER1 only has significant coefficient for its lagged variable. The impact of 
uncertainty measured by UNCER1 is small in magnitude and negative.  The impact of 
lagged UNCER2 is also negative, but insignificant. Despite the difference in the 
significance in the coefficients, all the models succeed in the tests of second-order 
autocorrelation and Sargan-Hansen J test of overidentification restrictions suggesting the 
validity of the instruments.   
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Table 12 - Estimation Results – Model 1 
  (1) (2) 
VARIABLES inv inv 
      









-0.0704   
(0.0550) 
L.sale_growth 0.0372** 0.0133*  
(0.0188) (0.00759) 
Constant 0.183*** 0.255***  
(0.0561) (0.0498)    
Observations 662 752 
Number of firms 56 56 
Wald test (p-value) 2.16e-10 1.54e-08 
AR(2) (p-value) 0.837 0.978 
Hansen test (p-value) 1 1 
Robust standard errors in parentheses    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
 Notes: The models are estimated using the Arellano-Bond estimator by Arellano and Bond (1991) and 
implemented by STATA 13 by Roodmand (2009). Robust cluster errors are reported in braces. Robust 
clustered standard errors are implemented by STATA 13 Roger (1994). Year dummies were used in each 
model. Instrument sets of lagged depend variable (GMM style) and all other right-hand-side variables (IV 
style). The following tests are applied: 1. The Hansen test as a test of erogeneity and validity of instrument 
subsets; (Since we are using robust clustered standard errors, Sargan test is inappropriate.) 2. AR(2) test as a 
test for second-order serial correlation, required by suing the Arellano-Bond estimator; 3. The Wald test with 
the null hypothesis that all the coefficients except the constant are zero. All tests are reported by their p-
values for convenience.  
2.5.2 Uncertainty and Innovation 
Since R&D expenditure is a special type of investments, uncertainty should have 
similar effects on R&D expenditure as on investments. The model specification is the same 
as the model for investment. However, the estimated impact of uncertainty on R&D 
spending is mixed. For UNCER1, the current period uncertainty has significant negative 
impact on R&D spending, while the lagged uncertainty only has an insignificant negative 
coefficient. The R&D spending shows significant positive persistency. For sales growth 
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rate, only the two-period lagged sales growth rate affect the R&D spending positively. The 
estimation results for UNCER2 are generally insignificant. All models in this table pass 
the autocorrelation test, but two of them, models for UNCER1_2 and 3, do badly for the 
Hansen test of overidentification. 
Table 13 - Estimation Results – Model 2 
  (1) (2) 
VARIABLES rd_intensity rd_intensity 
      









-0.611*   
(0.369) 
L.sale_growth 0.0518 0.114  
(0.0517) (0.0838) 
Constant -0.275 12.98  
(0.784) (9.292)    
Observations 653 702 
Number of firms 60 58 
Wald test (p-value) 0 0 
AR(2) (p-value) 0.495 0.366 
Hansen test (p-value) 1 1 
Robust standard errors in parentheses    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
 Notes: The models are estimated using the Arellano-Bond estimator by Arellano and Bond (1991) and 
implemented by STATA 13 by Roodmand (2009). Robust cluster errors (cluster by firm) are reported in 
braces. Robust clustered standard errors are implemented by STATA 13 Roger (1994). Year dummies were 
used in each model. Instrument sets of lagged depend variable (GMM style) and all other right-hand-side 
variables (IV style). The following tests are applied: 1. The Hansen test as a test of erogeneity and validity 
of instrument subsets (Since we are using robust clustered standard errors, Sargan test is inappropriate.); 2. 
AR(2) test as a test for second-order serial correlation, required by suing the Arellano-Bond estimator; 3. The 
Wald test with the null hypothesis that all the coefficients except the constant are zero. All tests are reported 
by their p-values for convenience. 
Finally, we test the impact of uncertainty on paten, innovation output. The estimation 
results are reported in Table 6. For this set of estimation, we have the weakest results. None 
of the uncertainty measures are shown to have significant results for patent output. Even 
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the impacts of R&D spending and sales growth rate are generally insignificant. The only 
significant variable across all models is patent stock, which shows significant positive and 
very consistent impact on patent production across all model. Therefore, from this set of 
estimation, we only find research capability has significant positive impacts on patent 
production. This insignificance is consistent with the discussion in the literature. It is 




Table 14 - Estimation Results-Model 3 
  (1) (2) (3) (6) (7) (8) (9) (12) 
VARIABLES pat pat pat pat pat pat pat pat 








pstock 0.000866*** 0.000865*** 0.000820*** 0.000814*** 0.000826*** 0.000825*** 0.000800*** 0.000794***  
(6.17e-05) (6.18e-05) (0.000159) (0.000156) (7.47e-05) (7.48e-05) (0.000149) (0.000129) 
L.uncer1_1 -0.00189* -0.00184* -0.00103 -0.000936 
    
 
(0.00109) (0.00107) (0.00232) (0.00187) 
    
L.uncer2_1 
    
0.107 0.106 0.145 0.132      
(0.156) (0.156) (0.298) (0.284) 
L.rd_intensity -0.00539* -0.00516** -0.00351 -0.00318 -0.00388* -0.00379* -0.00288 -0.00272  
(0.00279) (0.00261) (0.0140) (0.0157) (0.00199) (0.00193) (0.00514) (0.00196) 
L.sale_real -4.43e-05*** -4.45e-05*** -3.14e-05** -3.43e-05** -4.06e-05*** -4.08e-05*** -2.85e-05** -3.11e-05**  
(7.72e-06) (7.66e-06) (1.30e-05) (1.34e-05) (8.63e-06) (8.58e-06) (1.22e-05) (1.24e-05) 
Observations 665 662 665 662 732 731 732 731 
Number of 
firms 
61 58 61 58 58 57 58 57 
Log-likelihood -5706 -5265 -2824 -2388 -6487 -6057 -3028 -2603 
chi2 744.9 204.5 46.61 52.26 690.2 135.1 102 88.77 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
Note: For each uncertainty measure, the model is estimated using Poisson estimator Random Effect (RE) and Fix Effect (FE), and Negative Binomial Estimator 
Random Effect (RE) and Fix Effect (FE). Robust cluster errors are reported in braces except for Poisson FE with robust standard errors. All constants are omitted. 
Log-likelihood test with null hypothesis that some arbitrary group of k coefficients in the model is equal to zero, are applied. The Wald test with null hypothesis 
that all the coefficients except constant are zeros, are applied.  
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2.5.3 Summary of Results 
To summarize the estimation results, we find that uncertainty has possible negative 
impacts on investment and R&D spending. The results meet our expectation of the impact 
and are consistent with relevant literature findings. Lagged effect patterns are statistically 
confirmed for both investment and R&D spending. However, our estimated impact of 
uncertainty on patent production is week and ambiguous. Some studies in the uncertainty 
literature find that large firms are less affected by uncertainty (e.g. Koetse et al., 2006, 
Ghosal and Yang, 2015). As our sample of firms are all top firms in the pharmaceutical 
industry, the weak impact of uncertainty is expected. 
2.6 Conclusion 
Using a panel data of the U.S. and European pharmaceutical firms, we are able to 
test the effects of uncertainty on firms’ investments, R&D expenditure, and innovation 
performance. The most important contribution of the paper is that this is the first paper to 
test the effects of uncertainty on the three closely-related variables using the same dataset. 
Therefore, the estimation results contribute to the debates of the effects of uncertainty on 
firms’ investment decision making and innovation performance, which still don’t have 
conclusive opinions. We find significant negative effects of uncertainty on both investment 
and R&D spending, but we do not find significant evidence for the impact of uncertainty 
on patent production. 
Our study bears three major limitations. First, we use patent application numbers as 
the measure for innovation, which is a common practice in the literature. However, due to 
the fact that patents vary in their value or financial benefits for the firm. Our measure of 
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innovation is not accurate in the term of innovation product quality. Second, the validity 
of uncertainty measures we used in the paper are all limited to the method of regression or 
calculation. We were not able to get a survey-based measure for robustness checks. Finally, 
our conclusions from studying the dataset of large firms in the pharmaceutical industry 
cannot be applied to other industries that are not similar to our dataset. Therefore, although 
our study can contribute to the debates on the effects of uncertainty, the conclusion cannot 
be generalized. In addition, for the potential “incidental parameters problem” in fixed effect 
Negative Binomial regression models, we have noticed several options to deal with this 
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CHAPTER 3. MEDICAL DEVICE RECALLS 
3.1 Introduction 
Medical devices are a critical part of the US economy, equaling roughly 6 percent of 
total health expenditures (Grennan and Town 2015). They provide lifesaving assistance 
such as coated arterial stents, MRIs, or defibrillators, or may be a useful part of the medical 
system that is less complex such as syringes and stethoscopes.  When there are defects in 
such devices, the results can vary in terms of safety impact to people from minimal harm 
to potentially life threatening. 
Devices may be recalled from use because of defects before or after a serious crisis. 
Recalls are remedial actions that companies take, either voluntarily or under FDA 
notification, regarding potentially dangerous health risks for medical devices that are either 
defective or unsafe. A US government General Accounting Office Report (2011) offers a 
number of potential factors that are associated with for medical device recalls. These 
include process control, device design, software design, component design/selection, false 
or misleading labeling, mistaken use of materials or components, and/or employee error.  
Many of these factors implicate issues within the supply-chain, operations management, 
organizational management (e.g., regarding compliance, quality control and innovation 
within the firm) as well as management of various parts of production and delivery across 
complex supply chains.  The FDA data show that the number of medical device recalls 
have increased over time but so have the number of devices. In terms of the examining the 
underlying determinants of medical device recalls, the literature is relatively small and 
much remains unclear about what drives specific devices to be recalled.   
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This paper makes a number of contributions. First, we seek to examine the firm level 
determinants that contribute to medical device recalls in the context of product quality.  
Regulation of medical devices may impact innovation, a point first made by Peltzman’s 
(1974) seminal paper on the FDA in the pharmaceutical context. However, pharmaceutical 
regulation has a much longer history than medical device regulation and the relationship 
between the recall regime (Thirumalai and Sinha 2011), and innovation in medical devices 
(Chatterji (2009), Chatterji and Fabrizio (2015)) remains understudied. 
Second, the firm-size and organizational structure of the medical device industry is 
complex and there is variation as to types of firms that participate in the manufacture of 
devices.  For example, some firms are very large multi-product conglomerates across many 
industries such as General Electric, Siemens and Phillips.  Other firms are multi-product in 
the broader healthcare industry, and make pharmaceuticals, medical devices, among other 
products: e.g., Johnson and Johnson. Then there are firms that are primarily medical device 
firms but large and multi-product, such as Medtronic and Boston Scientific.  Finally, there 
are much smaller firms that produce a single medical device.  Given this heterogeneity and 
context, we add to the literature that examines the economies of scale and scope in 
production and in the supply-chain among manufacturing firms and related to issues such 
as product complexity and the amount of vertical integration (for example, Williamson 
(1985), Hendricks and Singhal (2001), Rawley and Simcoe (2010), Cachon and Terwiesch 
(2012)).  
Third, we focus on firms’ financial and economic conditions that may impact 
medical device recalls. A number of papers analyze issues such as sales, growth and 
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profitability within the medical device sector.  We add to this literature (Thirumalai and 
Sinha 2011) in the context of medical device recalls.  
Fourth, we add to the literature more generally on recalls.  Examining medical 
devices permits us to focus on recalls in a single industry.  This adds to existing knowledge 
on medical device recalls (Thirumalai and Sinha 2011), as well as having potential 
implications for the study of recalls in other sectors such as toys (Hora, Bapuji, and Roth 
2011), and automobiles (Rupp and Taylor 2002; Haunschild and Rhee 2004; Eilert, 
Jayachandran, Kalaignanam, and Swartz 2017).  There are other papers that focus on 
recalls across multiple industries (Chen, Ganesan, and Liu 2009; Marucheck, Greis, Mena, 
and Cai 2011; Cleeren, Dekimpe and van Heerde. 2017) and make generalizations, but 
these may not necessarily hold for the medical device industry. 
Finally, to enable a detailed examination of recalls, we have compiled a large and 
comprehensive dataset which includes data on recalls we hand-collected from the FDA 
website. The firm-level recall data were then merged with a range of firms’ financial and 
economic data. Based on our substantial dataset, we are able to conduct an extensive 
analysis of the firm-level determinants of medical device recalls. 
In our empirical analysis, our objective is to examine whether there are systematic 
longer-run differences in recalled devices across the firms in our sample, and whether firm-
specific and device-specific attributes can explain the differences. Attempting to parse out 
these longer-run relationships allows us to examine, for example, whether the systematic 
differences in firms’ R&D spending, extent of vertical integration in components 
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manufacturing, firm size, complexity of the medical devices, firm’s national identity, 
among other variables, generate higher or lower number of recalls.   
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide a 
background of the FDA and how it regulates medical devices generally and its processes 
for medical device recalls.  Section 3 provides a discussion about product quality and 
explains variables that we use to test for relationships and causality for quality on medical 
device recalls. Next, in Section 4 we go through the empirical specification while in Section 
5 we discuss the data and the variables. We offer estimation and results in Section 6 and a 
discussion and summary of the results in Section 7. Finally, we conclude with policy 
implications and recommendations in Section 8. 
3.2 FDA Institutional Details and Process 
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is responsible for the regulation of 
medical devices. 20 Its role in the first stage is to guarantee the “safety and effectiveness” 
of medical devices via pre-market approval of devices.  As part of its pre-market 
supervision, the FDA classifies medical devices into three classes of products based on the 
level of risk and the level of pre-market review.  Class I devices are those that pose the 
least risk, Class II devices pose moderate risk, and Class III devices the highest risk to 
                                                 
20 FDA formally defines a medical device as follows ((Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 2005, Sec. 
201 (h), 21 U.S.C. 321):  “A medical device is "an instrument, apparatus, implement, machine, contrivance, 
implant, in vitro reagent, or other similar or related article, including a component part, or accessory which 
is: recognized in the official National Formulary, or the United States Pharmacopoeia, or any supplement to 
them; intended for use in the diagnosis of disease or other conditions, or in the cure, mitigation, treatment, 
or prevention of disease, in man or other animals; or intended to affect the structure or any function of the 
body of man or other animals, and which does not achieve any of its primary intended purposes through 
chemical action within or on the body of man or other animals and which is not dependent upon being 
metabolized for the achievement of any of its primary intended purposes."   
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patients.  An example of a Class I device is a syringe while an example of a Class II is a 
powered wheelchair. In contrast, an example of a Class III device is a pacemaker (which 
is implanted into the body). Yet another category of devices are exempt from premarket 
approval, such as stethoscopes.  A number of statutory changes (1997, 2002, and 2007) 
have occurred to speed up approval times for various medical devices.  Since the 1997 
changes, the approval time for Class III devices has been reduced (Zinn, Allen, and Hacker 
2012).   
Even with a significant pre-market approval safeguards, once a device is released to 
the public there is the possibility that either pre-market approval did not anticipate broader 
situations in which potential defects for medical devices may emerge or firms may develop 
quality control and performance problems.  The FDA also ensures compliance with broader 
patient goals and to police against device defects through post-market surveillance such as 
through inspections.  The FDA inspects approximately 3,000 device firms every year.   
We summarize critical developments involving the FDA and various milestones in 
Table 13.  Though the first major device aspect of FDA regulation had its origins in the 
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic (FDC) Act of 1938, which extended control to various 
therapeutic devices, the modern medical device regulatory regime was born in 1976 with 
the Medical Device Amendments.  The purpose of the amendments was to ensure both the 
safety and effectiveness of medical devices. The amendments required medical device 
manufacturers to register with FDA and introduced quality regulation and procedures. It 
also introduced both pre-market approval and performance standards prior to marketing of 
the devices.   
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Table 15 - Some Key Dates in FDA Regulations 
Year Act/Event 
1938 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 
1976 Medical Device Amendments. Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539 (1976) 
1990 Safe Medical Devices Act of 1990; Pub. L. No. 101-629, 104 Stat. 4511 (1990) 
1991 Fraud, Untrue Statements of Material Facts, Bribery, and Illegal Gratuities; Final Policy; FDA 
Compliance Policy Guide, 7150.09, 56 Fed. Reg. 46,191 (Sept. 10. 1991) 
2002 Medical Device User Fee and Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-250, 116 Stat. 1588 (2002) 
2002 Medical Device User Fee and Modernization Act (MDUFMA) 
2003 Medical Product Safety Network 
2005 Medical Device User Fee Stabilization Act of 2005 
2007 Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007 (FDAAA) 
2010 Medical Device Tax as part of Affordable Care Act- Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 9009, 10904, 124 Stat. 119, 
862, 1016 (2010) (PPACA), as amended by the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, 
Pub. L. No. 111-152, § 1405, 124 Stat. 1029, 1064 (2010)  
2010 FDA Office of Regulatory Affairs, Regulatory Procedures Manual 
2011 GAO Report: Medical Devices FDA Should Enhance Its Oversight of Recalls 
2011 FDA Report: The Case for Quality 
2012 Food and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act (FDASIA) 
2013 FDA Final Rule Global Unique Device Identification Database (GUDID), 78 FR 58786 
2015 GAO Study: FDA Ordered Post-market Studies to Better Understand Safety Issues, and Many Studies 
Are Ongoing 
2015 GAO Study: Medical Devices: FDA Ordered Post-market Studies to Better Understand Safety Issues, and 
Many Studies Are Ongoing 
In 1990, detection of device defects improved with the Safe Medical Devices Act.  
The act required health care facilities that used medical devices to report incidents of 
medical device defects to the FDA that might have probably caused or contributed to the 
death or other serious adverse outcome of a patient. Further, the act required manufacturers 
to conduct post-market surveillance on permanently implanted devices.  In furtherance of 
the quality aspect of devices, the act authorized the FDA to order medical device recalls.  
Further changes to improve the quality of medical devices resulted in the 2002 
Medical Device User Fee and Modernization Act. Among other things, it created 
provisions for medical device inspections by accredited third-parties.  It also created 
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requirements for reprocessed single-use devices.  That year, the FDA also launched the 
Medical Product Safety Network, which is a collaborative reporting program that identifies 
adverse effects relating to medical devices.   
In 2011, in part to respond to increases in the number of devices entering the market 
and a review of device quality related data regarding manufacturing risks, the FDA 
launched what it called the Case for Quality in 2011.  The case for quality included three 
core components: a focus on quality, enhanced data transparency and increased stakeholder 
engagement through improved collaboration. Finally, in 2015 the FDA promulgated the 
Final Rule Global Unique Device Identification Database (GUDID) to help properly label 
medical devices in their distribution and use and submit data to the GUDID. 
As with many areas of regulation, the FDA outsources much of the day to day 
compliance to its regulated firms (Ayers and Braithwaite 1992; Kaplow and Shavell, 1994; 
Toffel and Short 2011).  In this context, most detection and regulation of device recalls is 
voluntary, though the FDA orders some recalls.  When there are recalls, the FDA evaluates 
risk of recall from highest (Class I) to lowest (Class III).  There recall class are: 
1. Class I: serious adverse health consequences or death; 
2. Class II: temporary or reversible adverse health consequences or death; and 
3. Class III: minimal health consequences. 
A recall is triggered by firm awareness of a defect or other health risk.  When a firm 
becomes aware of a potential defect, it begins a process to investigate the potential defect 
and to notify the FDA.  There is a lag time between the time that firms investigate recalls 
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until the time they self-report to the FDA.  The FDA responds with a classification of the 
recall.  The firm creates a recall strategy at which point the FDA reviews the adequacy of 
the plan and suggests appropriate changes to the plan. A recall is terminated by the FDA 
when the FDA determines that reasonable efforts have been made by the manufacturer with 
regard to the recall. Unlike some consumer products where recalls may occur rapidly, we 
find that for Class I recalls this average is nearly 8 months. 
As the above timeline and process of FDA regulations related to medical devices 
shows, it has undergone noteworthy changes over the years resulting in intertemporal 
variations in procedures and recalls. Our data on the total number of recalls shows a clear 
upward trend over our sample period 2001-2015. There are likely several factors 
contributing to this. For example, entry of new firms to the industry, changing composition 
and complexity of devices, and the overall political-economy of the regulatory process. 
The political economy of device regulation has been studied over time, by Hamburg and 
Sharfstein (2009) Garber (2010), Kramer, Shauai and Kesselheim (2012), and most 
recently by Stern (2017).  Over time the FDA has made regulatory changes to attempt to 
promote innovation and bring products to market more rapidly.  This has been an 
evolutionary process and remains relatively understudied relative to a more robust 
literature on pharmaceutical FDA regulation. 
3.3 Modeling Product Quality 
In this section we outline an empirical model of the determinants of a firm’s product 
(medical device) quality. The specific approach we take is to consider a firm’s product 
quality production function. Under this approach, the firm’s product quality as a 
 
 103 
deliverable (or output). We then specify firm-specific inputs and attributes that could 
influence the firm’s product quality. 
While we discuss a wide array of variables that may influence product quality, due 
to some data limitations we note later, in this paper we are unable to include the full set of 
device-specific characteristics. The extensions of this paper will include those 
characteristics. 
Potential factors that may be inputs into a firm’s product (medical device) quality 
may include: 
(1) Innovation expenditures (R&D). The literature on innovation in medical devices 
is considerably smaller than that of pharmaceuticals (Thirumalai, and Sinha 2011; 
Goldman and Lakdawalla 2012; Stern 2017). 21  The prior literature shows that there are 
some differences between innovation in pharmaceuticals and medical devices.   Medical 
devices tend to have a shorter innovation process and smaller firms exhibit less entry than 
pharmaceuticals.  R&D does play an important role in the medical device industry. 
Approximately 9-11 percent of revenue in device companies is spent on R&D while for 
smaller device firms (those with $5 million or less in revenues), the average R&D 
expenditure is 343 percent of revenues (Chatterji, Fabrizio, Mitchell and Schulman 2008). 
Product quality is often used to measure R&D success (Harter, Krishnan and 
Slaughter 2000, Eggers (2014).  We suggest that higher R&D expenditures by a firm are 
                                                 
21 There is a broader literature on medical devices but it tends not to on the issues involving recalls and 
their relationship to innovation.  See Chatterji (2009), Garber (2010), Zuckerman, Brown and Nissen 
(2011), Chatterji and Fabrizio (2015).  
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expected to contribute to higher product quality (lower recalls) for medical devices. High 
value components require more R&D intensity as these components are the ones more 
likely to command higher margins because of quality differentiated products (Pisano and 
Teece 2007).22    
(2) Firm size (Size). Firm size may matter, but there are countervailing forces and 
this implies that the net effect is ambiguous.  Larger firms may have a variety of 
organizational, incentive, compliance, and other problems that may negatively affect 
delivery of quality. Firms benefit from increased economies of scale as the cost of 
production reduce per unit.  However, there reaches a point at which various costs of 
organization and agency costs mount which reduces the efficiency of scale.  That is, 
organizational complexity may dictate diseconomies of scale that create inefficiencies in 
ownership (Williamson 1985).  For some firms, organizational complexity creates 
diseconomies of scale for which smaller firms are better to address agency cost problems 
than larger ones (Zenger 1994; Hendricks and Singhal 2001; Shaver and Mezias 2009). 
Likewise, larger firms, with its layers of bureaucracy may be more prone to inertia (Miller 
and Chen 1994).  
Another strand of literature suggests that firm size may positively relate to firm 
innovation (Damanpour 1992). Typically, smaller firms tend to be better suited to exploit 
product innovations due to specialized technological knowledge.  This is due in part to 
more layers of hierarchy at larger firms, and more rigidity regarding changes that otherwise 
may lead to significant new types of innovation.  In contrast, larger firms are more effective 
                                                 
22 We note however that new processes may create disruptions in learning routines, as explored by Hatch 
and Mowrey (1998). 
 
 105 
at process related innovations (Yang, Zheng and Zhao 2012).  Large firms are able to 
leverage their specialized knowledge and routines via learning by doing to address more 
complex processes (Winter 2003). 
Quality is an important aspect that emerges from firm learning such as through 
quality control and total quality management programs (Li and Rajagopalan 1998; Iyer, 
Saranga and Seshadri 2013).  This may suggest a case for larger firms delivering higher 
quality. Larger firms may have more to lose in terms of reputation, etc., and may try to be 
more conscious about quality and reputation.  
Firm size also implicates the literature on economies of scope.  To the extent that 
larger firms develop economies of scope, the scope economies may allow for greater 
productivity of existing manufacturing. 23  A large firm can utilize its scope in R&D, 
distribution channels and marketing across a number of different products more efficiently 
than a single product smaller firm (Cachon and Terwiesch 2012).  However, a firm with 
too many product lines many create inefficiencies in management based on overly broad 
scope (Rawley and Simcoe 2010). 
(3) Sales growth (Growth). This variable measures a firm’s overall sales growth 
across all product lines and not just the recalled medical device. Faster firm-wide sales 
growth (overall expansion) may contribute to difficulties in components supply-chains 
coordination, quality assurance, and maintenance of quality standards. Certainly, based on 
prior research of firms that can be classified as high-growth, when such firms issue product 
                                                 
23 However, recent work by Brahm, Tarzijan and Singer (2017) suggests that scope economies may 
encounter frictions that reduce productivity such that there is an inverted U relationship regarding 
efficiency and product variety.  In other work Zhou and Wang (2017) find that there are trade-offs 
involving scope and scale economies in complex supply chain systems. 
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recalls, this results in a significant negative stock impact (Hendricks & Singhal, 2003, 
Thirumalai & Sinha, 2011). Faster growing firms may have trouble delivering higher 
quality because of issues of scaling production up too quickly without proper quality 
control systems in place (Zook 2016). As a result, faster growth may adversely affect 
maintaining quality and other standards. 
(4) Profitability (Profits). Higher profitability is expected to contribute to higher 
quality delivery as firms have the financial ability to invest in better process and product 
management, innovation, and quality assurance. However, findings regarding profitability 
and innovation are mixed (Rosenbusch, Brinckman and Bausch 2011).  Some papers find 
positive effects24 and some negative effects.25   
The relationship between profitability and recalls may not be clear.  One might 
imagine because of stock market effects due to direct costs and reputation, it is not clear 
which way that firms might respond with regard to compliance and quality systems.  Firms 
that choose short-term profitability might invest less in quality than firms that are more 
concerned about long-term profitability and reputation effects. 
(5) Degree of vertical integration (Integrate). An important aspect of a firm’s 
production structure is the degree of vertical integration for components production. Some 
firms can have large in-house parts manufacturing, whereas other firms subcontract 
extensively and maintain close collaboration with suppliers. The literature suggests that 
firms with superior capabilities in subcontracting components manufacturing and 
                                                 
24 McGee, Dowling and Megginson (1995) for example. 
25 Li and Atuahene-Gima (2002) for example. 
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coordination can increase product quality and procurement efficiencies.26 The overall set 
of characteristics related to supply-chains, procurement and coordination, however, are 
extremely difficult to measure.27 We follow Lieberman and Dhawan (2005) in creating a 
proxy measure: they use a firm’s “value-added” as a proportion of sales (Integrate) as a 
measure of vertical integration. Higher values of Integrate implies less reliance on suppliers 
and a greater percentage of in-house components production.28 Based on this literature, we 
expect higher Integrate to be related to potentially lower product quality on average.29  
(6) Product Complexity (Complex). The more complex a product, delivering quality, 
on average, will be costlier and difficult. The literature on supply chain management 
suggests that a product that requires more components and more significant component 
interaction creates more product complexity (Novak and Eppinger 2001).  Such complexity 
requires more coordination and therefore may increases costs. Thus, the more severe the 
defect, the more complex the fix may be for the medical device given the complexity of 
the device. In our analysis, we use two variables to measure whether a device is complex: 
(a) is the device implantable or not; and (b) the device class. We discuss these measures in 
more detail in our data section. 
                                                 
26 Helper and Sako (1995), Dyer (1996), Womack et al. (1990) and Lieberman and Dhawan (2005), for 
example, study these aspects for the automotive manufacturing by comparing strategies by the U.S. and 
Japanese producers in attaining product quality and production efficiencies. They show that the extensive 
components outsourcing model of the Japanese firms generated more efficient and higher quality outcomes. 
27 The empirical literature on the benefits for outsourcing is mixed. Compare for example Rothaermel, Hitt 
and Jobe (2006) and Mols (2010). 
28 As in Lieberman and Dhawan, this measure allows a test of the relative value of integration versus 
subcontracting. 
29 As noted by Lieberman and Dhawan (2005), the ratio of value-added to sales is not an indicator of the 
coordination aspects between the manufacturer and the components provider, which is clearly very 
important in assessing the totality of the subcontracting and coordination picture. In this sense the value-
added to sales ratio provides a relatively basic control variable.  
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(7) Time from device approval to recall (InMarket). One might hypothesize that the 
longer a device has been on the market, the more likely it is that any defects are detected, 
and the device potentially recalled. Since FDA approval and the amount of trials necessary 
may vary across devices, those devices that do not have significant clinical trials may not 
have the level of exposure to allow for defects to make themselves be revealed.  Therefore, 
more time on the market allows for the possibility of reducing the information gap 
regarding defects.30 However, the marketing literature suggests that the time to recall a 
project is related to the severity of the problems.  The more severe the problem, the larger 
the time to recall in automobiles (Eilert, Jayachandran, Kalaignanam, and Swartz 2017).  
Like automobiles, defects in medical devices may not always be detected rapidly. Also like 
automobiles, many device companies produce a series of products.  The same authors find 
that in increase in scope of products increases the time to recall.  
(8) Recalled medical device sales (DeviceSales). This argument is similar in spirit to 
InMarket. The more are the number of units of the specific device sold, the more likely it 
is that any defects are detected and the device potentially recalled. However, the size of the 
recall may delay the recall because of the complexity of having to manage the recall of 
additional units (Eilert, Jayachandran, Kalaignanam, and Swartz 2017). 
(9) Firm Type (Type). Does the firm make medical devices only, or does it produce 
devices as part of the firm’s broader multi-product operations spanning across industries? 
A firm that is specializing in devices only is likely to be better able to control for various 
                                                 
30 Dasgupta and Xie (2017) suggest the management issues generally that arise in recall situations is a 
trade-off between how precise the knowledge is about a potential defect on the one hand versus waiting for 
more information and risking a costlier recall that also may result in injury or death on the other hand. 
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process, compliance and operations, supply chains, and deliver better quality (fewer 
recalls). Thirumalai & Sinha (2011) find that a greater product scope makes medical device 
recalls more likely.  However, no work on medical devices examines firm type in terms of 
scope as say between recalls for a conglomerate firm such as General Electric and a 
multiproduct device firm such as Medtronic. 
(10) Nationality (US). The nationality variable could potentially proxy for multiple 
characteristics. First, U.S. headquartered firms may potentially be in a better position to 
understand U.S. FDA regulatory processes and approvals standards. Across jurisdictions 
there are different regulatory standards and differences in quality control.  Steven, Dong 
and Corsi (2014) find that offshore outsourcing is more likely to have quality problems 
than outsourcing domestically.  Similarly, in work regarding compliance and corporate 
governance, family firms are less willing to list (and be subject to more stringent 
regulation) in jurisdictions where compliance standards are stronger (Saudagaran and 
Biddle 1995; Chung, Cho, and Kim (2015)).  If this is so, then U.S. firms would be less 
likely to have recalls. A counter to this argument is that many of the foreign firms have 
significant operations in the US. If this is so, then it is less clear whether US firms have an 
advantage. Within the compliance relating to corporate governance and securities 
compliance Reese & Weisbach (2002) and Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz (2004) suggest a 
bonding hypothesis that foreign firms will list in the United States as a way to have higher 
standards.  Further, U.S. firms on average may have different organizational structures, 
corporate cultures and compliance mechanisms compared to foreign firms. The US 
variable would help proxy for these aspects.  
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Considering medical device quality as an output, and the various inputs and attributes 
noted above, we have a product-quality production function. Our dependent variable is 
product recalls, which is the inverse (negative) of quality. Our control variables are 1-10 
noted above. In our sample, all firms have at least one device recall over our sample 
period.31  
𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑖 =  𝐴𝑖 ⋅ 𝒁𝒊 ⋅ 𝜖𝑖  (14) 
 
In specification (14), the dependent variable, 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑖 , is the number of recalled 
devices for the firm, the subscript i denotes firm, 𝒁𝒊  is the vector of variables 1-10 
described above, and 𝜖𝑖 is the error term (we discuss the characteristics of the error term in 
more detail in the next section). The term 𝐴𝑖  represents the unobserved firm-specific 
overall technology by which the firm converts various resources and attributes to delivering 
product quality. 
As we noted earlier in this section, due to some data limitations we note later, in this 
paper we are unable to include the full set of device-specific characteristics. The extensions 
of this paper will include those characteristics. 
3.4 Empirical Specification 
                                                 
31 Our data only cover those firms that had devices recalled. Our data do not include firms with zero recalls. 
Creating a dataset that is encompassing and includes all firms selling medical devices in the US is beyond 
the scope of our study as it entails identifying all US and foreign firms selling devices in the US. Prior 
studies such as Thirumalia and Sinha (2011) also have samples containing only those firms that have 
positive recalls.  
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Our objective is to examine whether there are systematic longer-run differences in 
recalled devices across the firms in our sample, and whether firm-specific and device-
specific attributes can explain the differences. Attempting to parse out these longer-run 
relationships allows us to examine, for example, whether the systematic differences in 
firms’ R&D spending, or extent of sub-contracting components, or firm size, among other 
variables, generate higher or lower number of recalls. In this sense, specification (14) 
allows us to examine how the variables in 𝒁𝒊 affect recalls. 
As our estimation is for a cross-section of firms, to go from specification (14) to a 
cross-firm regression, we specify 𝐴𝑖 = 𝐴 + 𝜂𝑖 where A reflects the “common elements” 
across the firms of the technology by which firms deliver medical device quality, and 𝜂𝑖 
the idiosyncratic firm-specific component. 
In specification (14), therefore, the error term is modeled as: 𝜖𝑖 = 𝜐𝑖 + 𝜂𝑖. The term 
𝜂𝑖  is the firm-specific idiosyncratic component noted above. The term 𝜐𝑖  includes any 
other omitted (from the specification) factors that influence a firm’s delivery of product 
quality. The elements of  𝜐𝑖  are firm-specific and could, for example, include a firm’s 
attributes related to overall organizational structure, legal and regulatory compliance 
structures and mechanisms, unobserved aspects of a firm’s supply-chain, among others. In 
our analysis, some of these firm-specific elements are unmeasured as we do not have any 
variables to proxy these aspects. Having said this, we do have variables included in our 
model, like Type, Size, Integrate, and US, among others which indirectly proxy for some 




3.5 Data and Variables 
The FDA enforcement reports provide announcements on medical device recalls 
covering Class I, II, and III recalls and collects various information about the recalled 
device and firm.  We collected data from the FDA Medical Device Recalls database.32 The 
database contains FDA Medical Device Recalls since 2001. This database is a collection 
of the weekly FDA Enforcement Reports.  Information collected for the Enforcement 
Reports includes the class of the recall, the product name, product code, whether or not the 
device is in vitro, the PMA/510(K) Number, the recall date, recall number, reason for the 
recall, recalling firm and the root cause of the recall.  The information was collected for 
class I recalls starting 2001 and up to 2013.33  The actual total number of recalls is smaller 
than those reported by the Enforcement Reports because they count as separate recalls 
multiple product recalls from the same firm on the same day.  These are products from the 
same product line.  Put differently, the FDA recall data is poorly organized (does not easily 
identify products from the same product line so that it seems like there are multiple 
products being recalled – this reduces recall numbers by roughly ¼). Overall, there are 315 
recall records in Class I recall dataset for the period 2001 to 2013. There are 258 unique 
firm names in the Class I recall data.  We collapse these multiple entries into one recall, as 
per Thirumalai and Sinha (2011). 
                                                 
32 See https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfRES/res.cfm.  
33 The database does not contain information on class 1 recalls for 2002, but contain data for 2001 and then 
for 2003 onwards.    
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Data on the number of medical devices recalled 34 , Complex, InMarket, and 
DeviceSales were compiled from the FDA database. 
(a) We proxy device complexity, Complex, by two variables from the FDA database: 
(i) Implantable device (ComplexImplant). Implantable device is a subset of 
devices that are specific to something that are implanted in the body. The assumption 
is that devices that are implanted are on average more complex, likely require a high 
degree of sophistication and product quality, and failures can be significantly 
detrimental to a patient’s health. Implant is entered as a dummy variable where 
Implant=1 if the device is implantable, and =0 otherwise; and 
(ii) Device class (ComplexDeviceClass). This is a contributing factor to a device’s 
complexity. The device class can be I, II or III. Class I devices are deemed to be low 
risk and are therefore subject to the least regulatory controls. For example, syringes 
are classified as Class I devices. Class II devices are higher risk devices than Class I 
and require greater regulatory controls to provide reasonable assurance of the 
device’s safety and effectiveness. For example, powered wheelchairs are classified 
as Class II devices. Class III devices are generally the highest risk devices and are 
therefore subject to the highest level of regulatory control. Class III devices must 
typically be approved by FDA before they are marketed. For example, replacement 
heart valves are classified as Class III devices. 
                                                 
34 Ideally, we would like to have the number of recalls scaled by a size variable, such as the number of 
products. Therefore, the correlation between the number of recalls and DeviceSales can be restricted to 
show only the true effect except the effect from firm size or sale. However, given the size and diversity of 
the firms, it is not possible to get data on the number of products the firm makes.  
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(b) To calculate the time a recalled device has been in the market, InMarket, we use 
data on the date the device was approved to the date it was recalled, measured in the number 
of years (each month is denoted by 1/12). 
(c) Number of units sold (sales volume) of the recalled device, DeviceSales. These 
sales occur during the period the eventually recalled device was sold in the market. 
As we are conducting an empirical analysis of product recalls and need economic 
and financial data, we focus only on the publicly traded firms both U.S. and foreign. Our 
financial data are from Compustat, including both Compustat North America and 
Compustat Global. While many firms subject to device recalls are private, there is no 
systematic way of obtaining the necessary economic data on those firms.35  After dropping 
these firms, we have 166 firms (including both parents and subsidiaries) left in our 
sample.36  These firms either have or belong to firms with financial data in Compustat. 
These 166 firms belong to 71 parent firms. After dropping 4 more firms37, we finally have 
67 parent firms with financial data from Compustat in our sample. The related recall data 
we use are associated with 212 of the total 315 Class I recall records available from the 
FDA.38  
                                                 
35 Other papers in the literature such as Thirumalai and Sinha (2011) also consider publicly traded firms in 
their analysis.  
36 As noted earlier, there are 258 unique firm names in the Class I recall data. 
37 The reason for dropping these firms include: (1) the firm was acquired by or merged into another firm 
before 2000, the beginning of our sample period; (2) the firm has many unusual values and only started 
during the late part of our sample period. 
38 We offer the following summary of our data. There are a total of 315 Class I recall records with 258 
unique firm names (both parent and subsidiary firms). We identify the parent firms using the ownership 
relation data from MergentOnline (Bloomberg as reference for ownership changes). From this we obtain a 
total of 71 “parent” firms with financial data in Compustat (166 of the 258 firms). We then drop 4 firms 
due to M&A or data anomalies. The final sample contains 67 firms, which are associated with 212 of the 
315 recall records. 
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We matched the recall data with Compustat financial data 2001-2015. The data on 
firm-level R&D, Size, Growth, and Profits are from the Compustat North-America and 
Global. The variables are: 
(a) As is standard in the literature, we measure R&D as R&D-intensity: the ratio of 
R&D expenditures to sales. 
(b) We use the commonly used measure for firm size: the number of employees. 
(c) We use a measure of profitability: net profit margin defined as follows: 
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛 = [
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒
] .39  As some of our firms are foreign and their equities 
traded in foreign exchanges, we were unable to get their stock prices. 
(d) Real sales growth, measured as the average annual rate of growth of real sales. 
(e) Following Lieberman and Dhawan (2005), we use a measure of vertical 
integration, measured as the ratio of value-added to sales. 
To measure the type of firm, Type, we used information on each firm’s primary and 
secondary SIC codes. We classify three types of firms: 
(i) Type 1 are firms that only make medical devices (e.g., Boston Scientific, 
Medtronic). We label these firms TypeDevices =1 if the firm is devices only, and =0 
otherwise; 
                                                 




(ii) Type 2 are firms that are in the broader healthcare industry which make 
devices but also pharmaceuticals and related products (e.g., Abbott, Johnson & 
Johnson). We label these firms as TypeHealthcare =1 if the firm is in devices and broader 
healthcare, and =0 otherwise; and  
(iii) Type 3 are firms that are multi-product conglomerates producing a wide 
range of products outside of the healthcare area (e.g., General Electric, Siemens, and 
Phillips). We label these firms as TypeConglomerate =1 if the firm is a conglomerate, and 
=0 otherwise.  
As there are three Type dummies, in the estimated regression we enter two dummies. 
Finally, we examined where the firm was headquartered. We created a dummy 




Figure 6 - Top 15 firms with the most recalled devices 
Notes: The figure shows the total number of recalled devices over our sample period for 
each firm. 
 
Figure 7 - Total trend of recalled devices and the proportion of top 5 
Notes: The red line shows the total number of Class I recalls per year. The bar chart is 
based on the top-5 firms in figure 1 and their recalled devices per year. 




































Figure 8 - Total number of recalled devices by country 
Notes: Based on the headquarters of the company. 
 
In Figures 6-8 we display some of the data. Figure 1 shows the top-15 firms with the 
most recalled devices. The top five contain a fairly wide mix of firms, including a giant 
multinational and multiproduct conglomerate like Siemens (the firm with the largest 
number of recalls), a medical devices specialty firm like Boston Scientific, and a broad-
based healthcare provider like Johnson and Johnson. In Figure 2 we show the composition 
of firms by nationality/headquarters. The US-firms have the largest share, but the US firms 
also dominate the number of firms in the sample. Next highest are firms of German origin. 
Finally, in Figure 3, we display the total number of recalls per year, and the shares of those 
recalls by the top-5 firms. The total number of recalls show a clear trend, but the 















data for Siemens, which has the highest number of recalls over the sample period, shows 
wide variation in the number of recalls per year over the sample period.    
Next, in Table 14, we present the summary statistics for the variables in our model. 
The main takeaway from the summary statistics is that there is large cross-firm variation 
in the data, both in the dependent variable (number of recalls) as well as the likely economic 
and device-specific determinants.  
Table 16 - Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Deviation 
Recalls 3.12 3.96 
In Market 7.82 7.01 
Devices Sales 933,175.00 4,040,860.45 
R&D Intensity 0.10 0.11 
Firm Size 31.88 68.32 
Net Profit Margin -0.05 0.53 
Vertical Integration 0.39 0.32 
Complex (Implant) na na 
Complex (Device Class) na na 
Notes: 
1. All income or spending variables are in millions. The firm size variable is in thousands. 
2. Recalls are the total number of Class I recalls over the sample period. 
3. “In Market” is the number of years that the device has been in the market until it is recalled. 
4. “Devices Sales” are the actual number of units of the eventually recalled device that were sold. 
5. “R&D Intensity” is the ratio of R&D expenditure to sales. 
6. “Firm Size” is the number of employees (in thousands). 
7. “Net Profit Margin” is the ratio of net income to sales revenue. 
8. “Vertical Integration” is a measure of firms’ vertical integration constructed as the ratio of value-added to 
real sales. 
 
* As noted in the paper, data on these two variables are incomplete at this time. These are left for future 
extensions of this paper. The dissertation chapter will cover only those variables noted above for which we 
have full information. 
9. Complex (Implant) are numerical coding for whether the device is implantable or not. 
10. Complex (Device Class) is the dummy variable for the FDA classification of the device based on risk. 
 
3.6 Estimation and Results 
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Our estimation results are presented in table 3. As we noted in the beginning of 
section 3, while we consider a wide array of variables that may influence product quality, 
due to some data limitations we are unable to include the full set of device-specific 
characteristics related to the complexity of the devices. In future extensions of this paper 
will include those characteristics. 
In table 3, in column A we estimate a baseline specification with the number of 
recalls regressed on R&D, firm size, net profit margins, and vertical integration. In column 
B we augment the specification by including a dummy for whether the firm is 
headquartered in the US or not. In columns C and D we add two device-specific variables: 
“Device Sales” – measuring the number of (eventually recalled) devices that were sold; 
and In Market – measuring the number of years and months the (eventually recalled) device 
was in the market. In column C we enter these two variables by themselves, whereas in 
column D we also enter an interaction term – the rational being that the combination of 
time and sales may be a better indicator for any flaws in a device to emerge and get 
reported. Finally, in column E we add a dummy variable for “Firm Type”: this takes value 
1 if the firm is a dedicated devices firm, and 0 otherwise. As noted in section 3, this serves 




Table 17 - Estimation Results 
Dependent variable: Number of Recalls 








































































































- - - - 0.172 
(0.202) 
Adj-R2 0.1807 0.2097 0.2935 0.3007 0.2946 
N 52 52 52 52 52 
Notes: 
1. For variable definitions, see table 2. 
2. Firm Type is a dummy that equals 1 if the firm is a dedicated medical devices firm. 
3. The following variables are measures in logarithms: Recalls (dependent variable); R&D Intensity; Firm 
Size; Vertical Integration; In Market; and Device Sales. Net profit margin is not in logarithms as for some 
firms it takes negative values.  
4. Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses. The asterisks *, **, and ***, represent 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
5. The total number of firms in the sample is 67. For the device-specific attributes related to “In Market” and 
“Device Sales” there are missing values resulting in 15 firms from being dropped from the regression. This 
results in a sample size of 52 firms. 
 
The main findings from table 3, and across columns A-E, are as follows: 
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(1) Firm size positively affects the number of recalls, with the estimated coefficients 
being significant at the 1% level. Among the economic and financial variables, this is the 
only result that is consistent across the various columns. Based on our discussion in section 
3, one potential reason for this finding could be that larger firms may have a variety of 
organizational, incentive, compliance, and other problems that may negatively affect 
delivery of quality. 
(2) R&D intensity coefficients are insignificant in all the columns. At face value, 
variation in R&D intensities across the firms in our sample does not appear to affect 
medical device product quality. The base level of R&D expenditures and intensity is quite 
high for all of the firms manufacturing medical devices, so it may well be the case that the 
variations across the firms, while quantitatively important, do not appear to matter much 
for the devices quality control.    
(3) Firms’ profit margin coefficients are all statistically insignificant. The variable 
was included to assess whether variation in profitability may affect product quality, with 
the potential for firms with greater profitability having more resources to invest in quality. 
This argument is not supported in our data. One plausible consideration is that relatively 
newer and smaller devices firms often are not profitable for many years, but this does not 
necessarily imply that their incentives to maintain high product quality is any lesser than 
more mature and profitable firms.  
(4) The measure of vertical integration is not significant in explaining differences 
across firms in the number of recalls. This result implies that even though there are 
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considerable differences across the firms in the extent to which they outsource their 
components, this feature does not appear to be important in devices recalls.   
(5) Firms that are headquartered in the U.S. have greater number of recalls on average 
compared to their foreign counterparts, but the coefficients are not significant at 
conventional levels. 
(6) Finally, we turn to the two variables specific to the devices: their sales, and the 
extent of time they were in the market before being recalled. Time in market is not 
significant. However, the number of devices sold is positive and significant. One 
explanation for this is that as more devices are sold, it allows for any problems to surface, 
potentially leading to recalls. We also interacted the time in market variable to devices 
sales. When we do this, both the time in market and device sales variables are insignificant, 
but the interaction term is positive and significant at the 10% level. Adding the interaction 
term does not materially add to our understanding of the process, other than reinforcing the 
view that a combination of time in market along with number of devices sold leading to 
potential quality issues coming to the surface.    
(7) The last variable we add to the model is Firm Type: this is a dummy that takes a 
value of 1 if the firm is primarily medical devices. This coefficient is insignificant, and 
does not material alter our other inferences.  
3.7 Concluding Remarks 
Our exploratory analysis appears to indicate that the economic and financial 
variables do not matter much in explaining variation in medical device recalls across the 
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firms in our sample. The two variables that are useful in explaining differences in recalls 
are firm size, and the number of devices sold in the market (before they are eventually 
recalled). Both are positively related to recalls. The firm size affect likely arises from a 
variety of organizational, incentive, compliance, and other problems that may negatively 
affect delivery of quality in relatively larger firms. The device sales effect could be arising 
from the fact that as more devices (with hidden problems) enter the market, the problems 
surface later. Our findings are robust with including of w wide range of potential economics 
and device specific variables, as well as controls for whether the firm is U.S. headquartered 
or not, and whether the firm is primarily a medical devices firm or not. 
Our future work in this area involves collecting a comprehensive data set on the 
complexity of the medical devices. We included two variables in our discussion of product 
quality: whether the device is implantable or not; and whether the device is rated higher in 
the risk class or not. Once we complete collection of these data, we will be able to better 
examine whether these two variables explain cross-firm variation in devices recalls, and 
whether the inferences regarding firm size, device sales, and other economic effects hold. 
Therefore, the relation between the explanatory variables and the number of recalls will 
become clearer. With more complete models, as well as more complex interaction terms 
between the variables, the insignificant results could be improved or better explained. In 
addition, with more complete data, we can also explore panel data models to investigate 
more questions. For example, using the number of recalls as the independent variable to 
explain other variables, such as innovation output. 
Based on our exploratory study, we also suggest that the FDA do more to improve 
systematization of the devices recalls data, in particular those data and information related 
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to the unique characteristics of the devices. We also think that there needs to be better 
monitoring and better coordination between regulated firms and the FDA.  Given the 
economic size of the industry, and the healthcare costs imposed by faulty devices, the 
welfare gains could be large from analysis of more detailed device specific characteristics 
and recalls. Such detailed data will help us better understand the delay from the time of 
uncovering of problem till the time the FDA is alerted, as well as issues like how much of 
this is due to human error and supply chain management rather than technology or gaps in 
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